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“NO PERSON . . . SHALL EVER  
BE MOLESTED ON ACCOUNT OF  
HIS MODE OF WORSHIP OR  
RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS . . . .”: 
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787 
AND STRADER V. GRAHAM 
ALLAN W. VESTAL* 
The Article looks at the first article of compact of the Northwest Ordinance, 
the religious liberty guarantee: “No person . . . shall ever be molested on 
account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments . . . .”  Congress 
provided that the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact would “forever 
remain unalterable.”  But in a fugitive slave case from 1851, Strader v. Graham, 
Chief Justice Roger Taney declared the articles of compact to be no longer in 
force.   
In evaluating Chief Justice Taney’s reasoning, the question posed at the 
dawn of the 20th Century by historian Professor Andrew McLaughlin is 
instructive: “Will they say that, because the men of 1787 did not act and speak 
in the terms of philosophy which arose from the civilization of the next 
century . . . they did not do what they intended to do?”  Using the language and 
history of the Northwest Ordinance, the Article argues that Chief Justice 
Taney’s conclusion was in error.   
The religious liberty protection of the Northwest Ordinance first article of 
compact is arguably broader than that of the First Amendment.  The article 
suggests that it should be available to protect individuals disadvantaged and 
discriminated against on the basis of their beliefs on matters of religion.  Such 
protection would extend to the over ninety million Americans who live in states 
as to which the first article of compact was made applicable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and 
the Constitution, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 is one of the nation’s 
constitutional documents.1  Enacted by the Confederation Congress, the 
Northwest Ordinance established territorial government for the Northwest 
Territory, and a path for admission to the Union for the states to be created out 
of the Territory.2 
 
1. See Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 929, 940–41 (1995).  The U.S. Code places the Northwest Ordinance at the beginning of Volume 
1, together with the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution.  
Id. at 929. 
2. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 governed the areas south of the Great Lakes, north and 
west of the Ohio River, west of Pennsylvania, and east of the Mississippi River. Ordinance of 1787: 
The Northwest Territorial Government, reprinted in 1 U.S.C. at LV (2006), 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field(DOCID+@lit(bdsdcc22501)) 
[https://perma.cc/QFU9-6Q5G] [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance] (reproduced in Appendix A).  The 
Northwest Territory as originally constituted included lands that would eventually become the states 
of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and the part of Minnesota east of the Mississippi 
River. Map of the Northwest Territory, WORLD MAPS, https://wiki--travel.com/detail/map-of-the-
northwest-territory-6.html [https://perma.cc/7ZQF-3QPE] (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).  In 1836, the 
lands between the Missouri River and the Mississippi River north of Missouri were added to the 
Wisconsin Territory and became subject to the articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance. Act 
of Apr. 20, 1836, ch. 54, §§ 1, 12, 5 Stat. 10, 10, 11, 15 (establishing the territorial government of 
Wisconsin).  This added the lands that would become the state of Iowa, the western portion of 
Minnesota, and the eastern portions of North and South Dakota. Randall Schaetzl, Michigan’s 
Boundaries Through Time, MICH. ST. U., 
http://geo.msu.edu/extra/geogmich/michigansboundaries.html [https://perma.cc/5UH7-79T4] (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2019).  
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But the Northwest Ordinance was not intended by Congress to merely 
manage the period to statehood.  The Ordinance provides permanent 
substantive guarantees for the people of the Territory and the states to be 
created.  Congress included in the Ordinance six “articles of compact” with 
guarantees ranging from religious liberty to habeas corpus to anti-slavery to 
freedom of navigation, and provided that the articles of compact would “forever 
remain unalterable.”3   
At the turn of the Twentieth Century, renowned historian Andrew 
Cunningham McLaughlin noted the importance of the Northwest Ordinance, 
which he termed “a great state paper,” valuable for “proclaiming in simple, 
straightforward language the fundamental principles of civil liberty.”4  He 
wrote: 
[T]he Ordinance of 1787, which, because of its wise provisions 
and liberal terms, has justly been considered one of the most 
important documents in our history.  It was the consummation 
of long discussion and much effort, and laid down a series of 
fundamental principles of great significance in building up the 
Union west of the mountains.5 
Notwithstanding the perpetual language of the articles of compact, in an 
1851 fugitive slave case, Strader v. Graham, Chief Justice Roger Taney 
declared the Northwest Ordinance “is not in force.”6  Chief Justice Taney’s 
analysis in Strader is unconvincing and is not redeemed by the reasoning of the 
two Supreme Court cases upon which he relied; Permoli v. City of New 
Orleans7 and Pollard v. Hagan.8   
It is interesting to contemplate how our legal history might have played out 
differently had Chief Justice Taney not erred in his finding that the Northwest 
Ordinance was not in force in 1854.  Of course, several of the articles of 
compact were overtaken by events within a few years of Strader.  The provision 
of the fourth article of compact, that the territory governed by the Northwest 
Ordinance “shall forever remain a part of this confederacy of the United States 
of America,”9 and the anti-slavery guarantee of the sixth article of compact,10 
were rendered moot in 1865 by Union bayonets and ratification of the 
 
3. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
4. ANDREW CUNNINGHAM MCLAUGHLIN, THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
1783–1789, at 122 (1905) [hereinafter MCLAUGHLIN, CONFEDERATION]. 
5. Id. at 120. 
6. 51 U.S. 82, 94 (1851). 
7. 44 U.S. 589 (1845). 
8. 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
9. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. IV. 
10. Id. § 14, art. VI. 
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Thirteenth Amendment.  The fifth article of compact, regarding the admission 
of states out of the Northwest Territory, was outdated by the admission of South 
Dakota and North Dakota in 1889.11  But the other articles of compact might 
have had continuing impact.12 
Had Chief Justice Taney not erred, and had the Northwest Ordinance 
remained in force, it is especially interesting to consider how the religious 
liberty protections of the first article of compact—that “[n]o person, demeaning 
himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account 
of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments”13—might have changed our 
legal history.  Between Strader in 1851 and the 1940s, when the First 
Amendment establishment and free exercise guarantees were incorporated as 
to the states, the religious liberty guarantees of the Ordinance might have given 
an alternative theory to citizens disadvantaged because of their beliefs on 
matters of religion.14   
Nor is the question of merely historic interest.  The religious liberty 
guarantees of the first article of compact are arguably broader than those of the 
First Amendment.  We might well consider how the correction of Chief Justice 
Taney’s Strader error might today provide citizens with another theory with 
which to vindicate their religious liberty claims. 
The following discussion starts with a brief history of Strader, the fugitive 
slave case that gave Chief Justice Taney the setting for his declaration that the 
Northwest Ordinance was no longer in force.  We then review the history, 
coverage, and operation of the Northwest Ordinance.  We then discuss Chief 
Justice Taney’s Strader opinion, starting with the two Supreme Court decisions 
upon which he relied.  Permoli involved the religious liberty guarantees of the 
first article of compact in the case of a priest prosecuted by the City of New 
 
11. Id. § 14, art. V.  South and North Dakota were both admitted to the Union in 1889. U.S. 
Territory and Statehood Status by Decade, 1790–1960, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 21, 2013), 
https://www.census.gov/dataviz/visualizations/048/508.php [https://perma.cc/2FKP-C6VD] 
[hereinafter Statehood Status].  They were the last states admitted from the Northwest Territory, as 
expanded.  The last state admitted that was governed by the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact, 
as incorporated by reference into the legislation creating the predicate territory, was Wyoming, which 
was admitted in 1890. Id. 
12. See infra note 381. 
13. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. I. 
14. The Supreme Court held the First Amendment inapplicable to the states even after 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876) 
(holding the First Amendment right to freely assemble not applicable to the states).  As to the religious 
liberty guarantees, the Supreme Court found in favor of incorporation only in the 1940s, nine decades 
after Strader. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (incorporating free exercise 
guarantee); see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) (incorporating guarantee against 
establishment of religion). 
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Orleans for violating its city ordinance against open-casket funerals.15  Pollard 
involved the fourth article of compact on navigable rivers and a case of 
competing claimants for a plot of land in Mobile, Alabama.16  The discussion 
continues with an argument Chief Justice Taney added to those from Permoli 
and Pollard, and concludes that the Strader opinion was in error because of an 
essential structural misreading of the Northwest Ordinance.  The discussion 
then turns to the reactions to Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Strader and 
concludes with a suggestion as to how a reversal of the Strader error might 
benefit contemporary litigants on some highly contentious issues. 
II. STRADER V. GRAHAM: THE KENTUCKY COURTS 
In the late summer of 1837, Dr. Christopher Columbus Graham, a leading 
citizen of Harrodsburg, Kentucky, wrote a letter granting permission for two of 
his slaves to journey some seventy-five miles to Louisville and beyond.17  The 
slaves, Henry and Reuben, were talented musicians and Dr. Graham was 
sending them to Louisville to perform and travel with Williams, “a free man of 
color:”18 
This is to give liberty to my boys, Henry and Reuben, to go to 
Louisville with Williams, and to play with him till I may wish 
to call them home.  Should Williams find it his interest to take 
them to Cincinnati, New Albany, or to any part of the South, 
even so far as New Orleans, he is at liberty to do so.  I receive 
no compensation for their services except that he is to board 
and clothe them.  My object is to have them well trained in 
music.19 
Dr. Graham had a hotel at Harrodsburg Springs, “the most fashionable 
resort in Kentucky,”20 where patrons received the healing benefits of the waters 
and were entertained by his slave musicians.  During the “watering season,” 
Henry and Reuben performed at Dr. Graham’s hotel, joined by a third slave, 
George.21  The three comprised “a splendid band of music” which was a 
centerpiece of Dr. Graham’s resort: 
 
15. See Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589, 589 (1845). 
16. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 212–13 (1845). 
17. Graham v. Strader, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon) 173, 174 (1844). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 173. 
20. Robert G. Schwemm, Strader v. Graham: Kentucky’s Contribution to National Slavery 
Litigation and the Dred Scott Decision, 97 KY. L.J. 353, 372 (2009) (quoting J. WINSTON COLEMAN, 
JR., THE SPRINGS OF KENTUCKY: AN ACCOUNT OF THE FAMED WATERING-PLACES OF THE 
BLUEGRASS STATE, 1800–1935, at 24 (1955)). 
21. Id. at 372–73. 
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During the day, this band was stationed in a stand on the 
grounds: “before daylight you are awakened by the delightful 
music which continues until night, when it is moved to a most 
splendid ball-room where you enter dazzled by the glittering 
lights and interesting company.”  As for the slave musicians: 
“Dr. Graham’s three slave boys composed the house orchestra, 
competing with the professional actors for the entertainment 
spotlight of the resort.  George, Henry and Reuben’s musical 
abilities were well known throughout the South, and for years 
they furnished the music for the gay dances and cotillions held 
in the large ballroom at the Springs.”22  
In the off-season, Henry and Reuben played engagements around the 
region.23  They journeyed with Williams once to Cincinnati, Ohio, once or twice 
to Madison, Indiana, and two or three times to New Albany, Indiana.24  
Accompanied by George they performed in towns near Lexington, Kentucky.25 
In his earlier letter granting permission for Henry and Reuben to travel out 
of Kentucky, Dr. Graham spoke of their character: 
They are young, one 17 and the other 19 year of age.  They are 
both of good disposition and strictly honest, and such is my 
confidence in them that I have no fear that they will ever act 
knowingly wrong, or put me to trouble.  They are slaves for 
life, and I paid for them an unusual sum; they have been 
faithful hardworking servants, and I have no fear but that they 
will always be true to their duty, no matter in what situation 
they may be placed.26 
At the end of January 1841, Henry, Reuben, and George, boarded the 
steamboat Pike in Louisville and made the overnight run to Cincinnati.27  But 
Dr. Graham’s confidence that his slaves would “be true to their duty” was 
misplaced.28  From Cincinnati they journeyed to Canada and freedom.29 
 
22. Id. at 373 (quoting COLEMAN, supra note 20, at 27, 44). 
23. Graham, 44 Ky. at 175. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 174. 
27. Id. at 173. 
28. Id. at 174. 
29. Id. at 173.  What became of Reuben, Henry, and George, whose escape to freedom in Canada 
ultimately led to the Supreme Court case of Strader v. Graham?  There is no further evidence as to 
Henry and George.  But Reuben may have reappeared in an intriguing entry in the 1861 Ontario census.  
The entry is for the southernmost portion of Essex County, directly across the Detroit River from 
Detroit, which was in the 1840s a frequent destination for escaping slaves.  It was for a man with the 
first name Reuben, who was listed as a “colored person” born in the United States. Canada West 
Census of 1861, LIBR. & ARCHIVES CAN. (Oct. 15, 2016), https://www.bac-
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Dr. Graham pursued the trio to Canada, intending to either kidnap them or 
persuade them to return to Kentucky and slavery.30  Failing in his attempt, he 
returned to Kentucky and sought compensation for his economic loss.31  He 
brought an action in the Louisville Chancery Court, seeking damages from 
Jacob Strader and James Gorman, the owners of the Pike, the steamboat upon 
which the trio had traveled to Cincinnati on the first leg of their journey to 
freedom, and an attachment of the steamboat itself.32  As outlined by the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals, the legal basis of the action was a pair of Kentucky 
statutes: 
The acts of 1824 and 1828, (Stat. Law, 259–60,) by their joint 
effect, make the owners, master, &c., and the boat liable, for 
taking out of the limits of this State, any slave, who has not in 
his possession, a record of some Court of the United States, 
properly exemplified, proving his right of freedom, unless the 
owner or master, &c., of the boat shall have the permission of 
the master of the slave for such removal; and not only is the 
offending party made liable in damages to the party aggrieved 
by such removal, but also, to indictment, and fine, and 
imprisonment, at the discretion of a jury, and the boat itself is 
made liable to the party aggrieved, to be proceeded against by 
suit in Chancery, and condemned and sold to pay the 
damages.33 
In the Chancery Court, the steamboat owners argued that Henry, Reuben, 
and George had gained their freedom before their travel to Cincinnati on the 
Pike, by virtue of Dr. Graham’s permission for their earlier travels to free states: 
[T]hat the said slaves are musicians, and have been, (since a 
long time previous to their alleged escape,) allowed by the 
 
lac.gc.ca/eng/census/1861/Pages/item.aspx?itemid=1038351 [https://perma.cc/J6JH-4YNT].  His 
estimated age was shown as 35; his estimated birth year was 1826. Id.  The age and birth year are 
somewhat inconsistent with the other information we have about the Reuben from Strader, but perhaps 
not fatally so.  If this entry was for the Reuben of Strader, we learn something of his life in Canada.  
He was a farmer and married to a thirty-five-year old “colored person” born in the United States whose 
name is indecipherable on the record. Id.  They lived in a log cabin and had four children: fourteen-
year-old Eliza, seven-year-old Jonathan, five-year-old Malissa, and newborn Comodore. Id.  The 
census record reports that Eliza was born in 1847 in the United States, which might be inconsistent 
with her being the daughter of the Reuben of the Strader case.  The other children are all listed as 
having been born in Canada.  Was this the Reuben of Strader?  We cannot know for sure, but the 
census record offers one final tempting clue: his last name.  Reuben would not have been identified by 
a last name when he was enslaved in Kentucky.  But once he reached Canada, he would have selected 
a last name.  The Canadian census tells us Reuben’s last name. Id.  It was “Strauder.” Id. 
30. Schwemm, supra note 20, at 353. 
31. Graham, 44 Ky. at 173. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 176. 
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complainant to travel about as free negroes, and to play at 
parties, public and private, and to receive their wages earned 
by them: and that they have frequently been allowed to go out 
of the Commonwealth as if they were free.34 
An amended answer supplemented the claim: 
[T]hat the complainant allowed the slaves to go to Louisville 
to live with Williams, a free man of color, to learn music, and 
afterwards gave them written permission to go to the State of 
Ohio, that they did go and remained there a long time, and were 
sent there by complainant’s direction, to perform service as 
slaves, and that in consequence thereof, they acquired a right 
to freedom, and are free, and were so when the bill was filed 
and long before.35 
In the Chancery Court Dr. Graham prevailed as to George, but not as to 
Henry and Reuben.36  On appeal by Dr. Graham, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
rejected the Chancery Court’s ruling as to Henry and Reuben, declaring that 
“these statutes, and the protection which they intended to give to the owners of 
slaves in Kentucky” should not be “frittered away by construction, and rendered 
wholly delusive.”37  Although the Court of Appeals was highly critical of Dr. 
Graham’s behavior, asserting that his “conduct . . . in regard to these slaves, 
was contrary to the laws and policy of the State, and furnished an evil example 
which was calculated to withdraw other slaves from their duties, and to create 
in them a desire for similar indulgences,”38 it found neither the pattern of travel 
nor the 1837 writing constituted sufficient evidence of permission by Dr. 
Graham.39 
The steamboat owners’ second argument involved the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787: 
It is contended . . . that the bill was properly dismissed as to 
them, because, under the authority contained in the writing 
referred to, and therefore with the consent of their owner, the 
 
34. Id. at 173–74. 
35. Id. at 174. 
36. Id. at 174–76. 
37. Id. at 176. 
Now, it seems to us, that unless these statutes, and the protection which they 
intended to give to the owners of slaves in Kentucky, are to be frittered away by 
construction, and rendered wholly delusive, the liability which they impose, 
cannot, in the absence of record evidence of freedom of the slave removed from 
the State in a steamboat, be avoided or evaded, except by showing the express or 
implied permission of the owner of the slave, that he may be so removed at the 
time.  
38. Id. at 184–85. 
39. Id. at 176–79. 
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slaves, Henry and Reuben, were taken into the free States 
northwest of the Ohio, where, by the ordinance of Congress, 
for the government of the Northwestern Territory, embracing 
those States, slavery was prohibited, for the purpose of 
working, and did there [sic] work as slaves, for wages received 
by Williams or themselves, and that they thereby became free 
before the asportation complained of, and consequently, that 
the complainant has no right to complain of that act, or to 
recover damages therefor.40 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected the argument that Henry and 
Reuben became free as a result of travel permitted by Dr. Graham to states 
governed by the Northwest Ordinance: 
We know that the ordinance referred to declares, “that there 
shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said 
territory,” &c., and that the States which have been formed in 
that territory reject slavery as an institution.  But while it may 
be admitted, that in consequence of this principle, no citizen or 
inhabitant of one of those States can hold another person as a 
slave in that State, it does not follow, and we do not admit that 
the citizen of another State, whose laws recognize and establish 
this species of property, loses instantaneously and forever, by 
the mere force of this general principle, all dominion and right 
of property in his slave whom he has taken with him in 
travelling through one of those States, or in a temporary and 
momentary sojourn for a particular purpose of business or 
pleasure, so that upon the voluntary and immediate return of 
both into their own State, the pre-existing relation of master 
and slave must, in view of their own laws, be regarded as at an 
end.41 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the matter to the Chancery 
Court in Louisville.42  It resurfaced in the Kentucky Court of Appeals three 
years later, when the intervening proceedings in the Chancery Court granting 
Dr. Graham relief for the loss of all three slaves were affirmed.43   
 
40. Id. at 179. 
41. Id. at 180. 
42. Id. at 187. 
43. See Strader v. Graham, 46 Ky. 633 (7 B. Mon.), 635 (1847).  Not all of the commentary on 
the case is accurate. Dena J. Epstein & Rosita M. Sands, Secular Folk Music, in AFRICAN AMERICAN 
MUSIC: AN INTRODUCTION, at 35, 42 (Mellonee V. Burnim & Portia K. Maultsby eds., 2d ed. 2015) 
(reporting incorrectly the Chancery Court outcome (“The court found that the unusual privileges 
permitted them rendered them restless under restraint and desirous of freedom.  Damages were 
denied.”) and ignoring proceedings in the Kentucky Court of Appeals and United States Supreme 
Court). 
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The matter was next appealed to the United States Supreme Court.44  
Jurisdiction of the Court was asserted under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789,45 based on the claim that the slaves were free before they embarked on 
the Pike, by virtue of the anti-slavery article of compact of the Northwest 
Ordinance.46 
Before reviewing the Court’s analysis in Strader, we turn to the history, 
coverage, and structure of the Northwest Ordinance. 
III. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787: “[F]OREVER REMAIN 
UNALTERABLE” 
A. History of the Northwest Ordinance 
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, “An Ordinance for the government of 
the territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio,” passed the 
Confederation Congress on July 13, 1787.47  It is comprised of fourteen 
sections.48  The first twelve sections provide the oftentimes mundane rules for 
the creation of the institutions of government in the territory prior to the 
 
44. See Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 93 (1851). 
45. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, § 25 (1789) (“That a final judgment or decree 
in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be 
had . . . where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any 
State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, 
and the decision is in favour of such their validity . . . may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in 
the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error . . . .”). 
46. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. VI (“There shall be neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted . . . .”). 
47. Id. § 14.  Only one individual in the Confederation Congress voted against passage, and there 
seems to have been a good explanation as to why: 
The vote on [the Northwest Ordinance of 1787’s] passage was unanimous, that 
is, the votes of the eight States present . . . were all affirmative.  Yates of New 
York was the only individual who voted no. . . .  The only explanation of this vote 
to be found, is given in Dane’s letter to Rufus King, . . . that Yates “appeared, in 
this case, as in most others, not to understand the subject at all.” 
John M. Merriam, The Legislative History of the Ordinance of 1787, AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 323–
24 (1888), https://www.americanantiquarian.org/proceedings/48055801.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BTU-
KYCJ]. 
48. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 1–14.  Although in most modern presentations the 
text of the Northwest Ordinance is divided into separately numbered sections, in the original document 
they were not.  In the original, only the six articles of compact were separately numbered. An Ordinance 
for the Government of the Territory of the United States, North-west of the River Ohio, LIBR. 
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/resource/bdsdcc.22501/?sp=1 [https://perma.cc/EZF9-JRVX] (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2019).  Thus, what we refer to as Sections 13 and 14 were, in the original, one long 
sentence presented in two paragraphs.   
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definition, creation, and admission of the three to five states which the drafters 
anticipated being formed out of the Northwest Territory.49  The twelve sections 
provide for a legislature,50 an administration,51 and a judiciary,52 as well as for 
other aspects of a territorial government.53 
The final two sections are very different, in tone and content, from the first 
twelve.  The thirteenth section speaks in terms of the fundamental principles 
which should forever be observed in the territory: 
Sec. 13.  And for extending the fundamental principles of civil 
and religious liberty, which form the basis whereon these 
republics, their laws and constitutions, are erected; to fix and 
establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, 
and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in 
the said territory; to provide, also, for the establishment of 
States, and permanent government therein, and for their 
admission to a share in the Federal councils on an equal footing 
with the original States, at as early periods as may be consistent 
with the general interest:54 
The thirteenth section introduces the fourteenth, which establishes six 
“articles of compact” which are permanent, not transitional and temporary like 
the first twelve sections: 
Sec. 14.  It is hereby ordained and declared, by the authority 
aforesaid, that the following articles shall be considered as 
articles of compact, between the original States and the people 
and States in the said territory, and forever remain unalterable, 
unless by common consent, to wit:55 
The six articles of compact speak in terms of permanent guarantees, 
perpetual commitments, and never-ending promises.  One cannot read the text 
of the articles of compact without getting a sense of the authors’ timeless 
intentions.   
The first article of compact deals with religious liberty:  
 
49. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 1–12, 14, art. V (“There shall be formed in the said 
territory not less than three nor more than five States . . . .”). 
50. Id. § 5 (creation of temporary laws), § 9 (election of legislature), § 10 (term of legislators, 
special elections), and § 11 (legislative function). 
51. Id. § 3 (appointment of governor), § 4 (appointment of territorial secretary), § 6 (appointment 
of militia officers), and § 7 (temporary appointment of civil officers). 
52. Id. § 4 (appointment of court), and § 7 (temporary appointment of magistrates). 
53. Id. § 1 (creation of territory as a district, subject to later division into two districts), § 2 
(creation of system of estates and succession), § 8 (effect of laws, creation of counties and townships), 
and § 12 (oaths of office and the election of a delegate to Congress). 
54. Id. § 13. 
55. Id. § 14. 
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No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly 
manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of 
worship, or religious sentiments, in the said territories.56   
Refuting any argument that the use of the nomenclature “in the said 
territories” in the first article of compact was intended to limit the guarantee to 
the period during which the areas governed by the Northwest Ordinance were 
territories and not states, the introductory language of Section 14 refers to 
“the . . . States in the said territory,” indicating that the “territory” reference was 
to geographic area, not a type of government.57 
The remaining five articles of compact deal with other topics of a 
permanent nature.  The second article of compact deals with legal guarantees—
for example, habeas corpus, cruel and unusual punishments, and sanctity of 
contract—to which inhabitants of the area will always be entitled.58  The third 
article of compact deals with schools, education, and the Native American 
population.59  The fourth article of compact deals with the guarantee of 
territorial integrity, allocation of the national debt, disposition of Federal lands, 
and the free navigation of inland waters.60  The fifth article of compact deals 
with the formation of states.61  The sixth and final article of compact deals with 
slavery.62 
The Northwest Ordinance was enacted prior to ratification of the 
Constitution.  After ratification, Congress acted to bring the statute into 
harmony with the new Constitution.  On August 7, 1789, a year after the 
Constitution was ratified, and five months after it became effective,63 Congress 
passed the harmonization amendment, An Act to provide for the Government of 
the Territory North-west of the River Ohio, which began: 
Whereas in order that the ordinance of the United States in 
Congress assembled, for the government of the territory north-
west of the river Ohio may continue to have full effect, it is 
requisite that certain provisions should be made, so as to adapt 
 
56. Id. § 14, art. I. 
57. Id. § 14. 
58. Id. § 14, art. II. 
59. Id. § 14, art. III.  
60. Id. § 14, art. IV.  
61. Id. § 14, art. V. 
62. Id. § 14, art. VI. 
63. The Constitution was declared ratified with the vote of the ninth state, New Hampshire, on 
June 21, 1788.  The Constitution went into effect on March 4, 1789.  Congress passed the re-enactment 
of the Northwest Ordinance on August 7, 1789. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789) (reenacting 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787). 
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the same to the present Constitution of the United States.64 
The 1789 harmonization amendment made only very minor technical 
changes to the Northwest Ordinance.  It designated a different recipient for 
reports from the territorial governor,65 provided a different mechanism for 
appointing and removing officers,66 and altered the procedure for the exercise 
of the territorial governor’s powers in his absence.67  The 1789 harmonization 
amendment made no changes in the articles of compact, clearly indicating that 
Congress believed they would “continue to have full effect” after ratification of 
the Constitution, without any action on its part.68 
B. Coverage of the Northwest Ordinance 
The Northwest Ordinance establishes a framework for territorial 
government and a pathway to statehood for the areas south of the Great Lakes, 
north and west of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi River.69  The 
Northwest Territory as originally constituted included lands that would 
eventually become the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin; and the part of Minnesota east of the Mississippi River.70 
 
64. Id. at 51.  Chief Justice Taney acknowledged the limited scope of the 1789 enactment in his 
Strader opinion. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 96 (1851) (noting “the act of Congress of August 7, 
1789, which adopted and continued the Ordinance of 1787, and carried its provisions into execution, 
with some modifications, which were necessary to adapt its form of government to the new 
Constitution”). 
65. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789): 
That in all cases in which by the said ordinance, any information is to be given, 
or communication made by the governor of the said territory to the United States 
in Congress assembled, or to any of their officers, it shall be the duty of the said 
governor to give such information and to make such communication to the 
President of the United States . . . . 
66. Id. at 53: 
[A]nd the President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint all officers which by the said ordinance were to have been 
appointed by the United States in Congress assembled, and all officers so 
appointed shall be commissioned by him; and in all cases where the United States 
in Congress assembled, might, by the said ordinance, revoke any commission or 
remove from any office, the President is hereby declared to have the same powers 
of revocation and removal.   
67. Id.: 
That in case of the death, removal, resignation, or necessary absence of the 
governor of said territory, the secretary thereof shall be, and he is hereby 
authorized and required to execute all the powers, and perform all the duties of 
the governor, during the vacancy occasioned by the removal, resignation or 
necessary absence of the said governor. 
68. Id. at 51. 
69. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. V. 
70. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
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Over the years, the geographic sweep of the Northwest Ordinance was 
expanded in two ways.  First, as the border of the nation moved west, the 
Northwest Territory was expanded by the inclusion of certain contiguous 
territories.71  Second, Congress from time to time incorporated the Northwest 
Ordinance by reference as the organizational basis of other, non-contiguous 
territories.72 
Through the middle of the 19th Century, the Northwest Ordinance area was 
reorganized, as portions of the Northwest Territory gained statehood, and 
expanded, as additional areas came within the coverage of the articles of 
compact through the expansion of the original Northwest Territory to include 
the contiguous territory between the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers.  Between 
1789 and 1849, Congress acted six times to revise the coverage of the 
Northwest Ordinance, to reflect the admission of states from the Northwest 
Territory and the expansion of the Territory to the Missouri River.  Congress 
acted with respect to the Indiana Territory in 1800,73 the Michigan Territory in 
1805,74 the Illinois Territory in 1809,75 the Wisconsin Territory in 1836,76 the 
Iowa Territory in 1838,77and the Minnesota Territory in 1849.78  In each 
instance, the application of the articles of compact continued without 
modification or exception.  For example, the 1836 statute which placed the 
lands between the Missouri River and the Mississippi River north of Missouri—
the areas that are now Iowa, the western portion of Minnesota, and the eastern 
portions of North and South Dakota—in the Wisconsin Territory, provided that 
they became subject to the articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance:   
That the inhabitants of the said [Wisconsin] Territory shall be 
entitled to, and enjoy, all and singular the rights, privileges, and 
advantages, granted and secured to the people of the Territory 
of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, by the articles 
of the compact contained in the ordinance for the government 
 
71. See infra text accompanying notes 73–78. 
72. See infra text accompanying notes 80–83. 
73. Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 1, 2 Stat. 58, 59 (dividing the Northwest Territory into two 
governments and thereby creating the Indiana Territory). 
74. Act of Jan. 11, 1805, ch. 5, § 1, 2 Stat. 309, 309 (dividing the Indiana Territory into two 
governments and thereby creating the Michigan Territory).  
75. Act of Feb. 3, 1809, ch. 13, § 1, 2 Stat. 514, 515 (dividing the rest of the Indiana Territory 
into two governments and thereby creating the Illinois Territory).  
76. Act of Apr. 20, 1836, ch. 54, § 1, 5 Stat. 10, 10 (establishing the territorial government of 
Wisconsin).  
77. Act of June 12, 1838, ch. 96, § 1, 5 Stat. 235, 235 (dividing the Territory of Wisconsin and 
thereby creating the Territory of Iowa). 
78. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 121, § 1, 9 Stat. 403, 404 (establishing the territorial government of 
Minnesota).  
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of the said Territory, passed on the thirteenth day of July, one 
thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven; and shall be subject 
to all the conditions and restrictions and prohibitions in said 
articles of compact imposed upon the people of the said 
Territory.79 
In addition, through the middle of the 19th Century Congress also expanded 
the sweep of Northwest Ordinance by incorporating the articles of compact by 
reference with respect to other, non-contiguous territories: the Southwest 
Territory in 1790,80 the Mississippi Territory in 1798,81 the Orleans Territory in 
1805,82 and the Oregon Territory in 1848.83  But here the coverage was 
sometimes selective.  For example, the Mississippi Territory was exempted 
from the sixth article of compact on slavery,84 and the Orleans Territory was 
exempted from both the second article of compact, on the rules of descent and 
distribution of estates, and the sixth article of compact, on slavery.85  
Congress did not make the articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance 
effective as to all of the territories created to the mid-point of the 19th Century.  
Before 1849, Congress created five territories to which the articles of compact 
of the Northwest Ordinance were not made applicable: the Louisiana Territory 
in 1804,86 the Missouri Territory in 1812,87 the Alabama Territory 1817,88 the 
Arkansas Territory in 1819,89 and the Florida Territory in 1822.90  After 1849, 
Congress did not make the articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance 
applicable to any of the fifteen territories it created.91   
 
79. Act of Apr. 20, 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 10, 15.  
80. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 123, 123 (establishing the Southwest Territory).  
81. Act of Apr. 7, 1798, ch. 28, § 3, 1 Stat. 549, 550 (establishing the Mississippi Territory). 
82. Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 23, § 1, 2 Stat. 322, 322 (providing for the government of the Orleans 
Territory).   
83. Act of Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 177, § 1, 3 Stat. 323, 323 (establishing the Territory of Oregon).  
84. Act of Apr. 7, 1798, ch. 28, § 3, 1 Stat. 549, 550.  The congressional action specifically 
excepted the article of compact on slavery. Id. 
85. See Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 23, § 5, 2 Stat. 322, 322.  The congressional action specifically 
excepted the articles of compact on the rules of descent and distribution and on slavery. Id. 
86. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 1, 2 Stat. 283, 283 (erecting Louisiana into the Louisiana 
Territory and Orleans Territory).   
87. Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, 2 Stat. 743, 743 (establishing the Missouri Territory).   
88. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 59, § 1, 3 Stat. 371, 372 (establishing the Alabama Territory).   
89. Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 49, § 1, 3 Stat. 493, 494 (establishing the Arkansas Territory).   
90. Act of Mar. 30, 1822, ch. 13, § 1, 3 Stat. 654, 655 (establishing the Florida Territory).  
91. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 49, § 2, 9 Stat. 446, 447 (establishing the New Mexico Territory); 
Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 1, 9 Stat. 453, 453 (establishing the Utah Territory); Act of Mar. 2, 1853, 
ch. 90, § 1, 10 Stat. 172, 173 (establishing the Washington Territory); Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 
§§ 1, 19, 10 Stat. 277, 283, 284 (establishing the Nebraska Territory and the Kansas Territory); Act of 
Feb. 28, 1861, ch. 59, § 1, 12 Stat. 172, 172 (establishing the Colorado Territory); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, 
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Either by the creation and expansion of the Northwest Territory, or by 
incorporation of some or all of the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact 
into the organizational documents of other territories, the first article of 
compact, on religious liberty, became effective as to lands which were 
eventually incorporated into eighteen states, with a combined contemporary 
population of more than 90,000,000 Americans.92 
C. Operation of the Northwest Ordinance Articles of Compact 
How did the Confederation Congress and, after ratification of the 
Constitution, Congress intend the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact to 
operate?  The language of the relevant Northwest Ordinance section can be read 
in three very different ways: as a statute, as a bilateral contract, or as a social 
compact. 
In Pollard v. Hagan, Justice McKinley identified the statutory possibility, 
that the Northwest Ordinance “is binding as a law.”93  Presumably, if the 
Northwest Ordinance is binding as a statute, it is a statute of the national 
government.  Section 1 begins: “Be it ordained by the United States in Congress 
assembled.”94  As to the authority for the articles of compact, Section 14 
provides: “It is hereby ordained and declared, by the authority aforesaid.”95  The 
construct “the authority aforesaid” is used elsewhere in the Northwest 
Ordinance.96  The reasonable reading of the text is that “the authority aforesaid” 
 
ch. 83, § 1, 12 Stat. 209, 210 (establishing the Nevada Territory); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, § 1, 12 
Stat. 239, 239 (establishing the Dakota Territory); Act of Feb. 24, 1863, ch. 56, § 1, 12 Stat. 664, 665 
(establishing the Arizona Territory); Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 117, § 1, 12 Stat. 808, 809 (establishing 
the Idaho Territory); Act of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, § 1, 13 Stat. 85, 86 (establishing the Montana 
Territory); Act of July 25, 1868, ch. 235, § 1, 15 Stat. 178, 178 (establishing the Wyoming Territory); 
Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 1, 26 Stat. 81, 81 (establishing the Oklahoma Territory); Act of Apr. 
30, 1900, ch. 339, § 2, 31 Stat. 141, 141 (establishing the Hawaii Territory); Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 
387, § 1, 37 Stat. 512, 512 (establishing the Alaska Territory).  
92. 91,400,000, consisting of: Alabama (4,870,000), Idaho (1,720,000), Illinois (12,800,000), 
Indiana (6,670,000), Iowa (3,150,000), Louisiana (4,680,000), Michigan (9,960,000), Minnesota 
(5,580,000), Mississippi (2,980,000), Montana (1,050,000), North Dakota (760,000), Ohio 
(11,660,000), Oregon (4,140,000), South Dakota (870,000), Tennessee (6,720,000), Washington 
(7,410,000), Wisconsin (5,800,000), and Wyoming (580,000). Resident Population of the U.S. in 2017, 
by State (Including the District of Columbia) (in Millions), STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/183497/population-in-the-federal-states-of-the-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/6VC3-9MUW] (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).  
93. 44 U.S. 212, 224 (1845). 
94. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 1. 
95. Id. § 14. 
96. Id. § 2 (“Be it ordained by the authority aforesaid . . . .”), § 3 (“Be it ordained by the 
authority aforesaid . . .”), and concluding paragraph (“Be it ordained by the authority aforesaid . . . .”). 
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refers to “the United States in Congress assembled,” as set forth in Section 1.97  
This is consistent with a reading of the Northwest Ordinance as being a 
statutory enactment of the Confederation Congress.   
But Justice McKinley’s statutory interpretation is problematic for a number 
of reasons.  First, the statutory interpretation is consistent with the first twelve 
sections of the Northwest Ordinance, which are the provisions governing the 
organization of the Northwest Territory.  But if sections 13 and 14 of the 
Northwest Ordinance, the articles of compact, are simply statutory enactments 
of the Confederation Congress, why does Section 14 declare the articles of 
compact to be “articles of compact, between the original States and the people 
and States in the said territory”?98  And why provide that the articles of compact 
can only be amended “by common consent”?99   
Further, if the articles of compact are Federal statutes, why not make them 
laws of general application as to all the states, both those original states and the 
new states to be formed out of the Northwest Territory?  Of course, the political 
answer is self-evident as to the sixth article of compact, forbidding slavery.100  
But why would the Confederation Congress have declined to make the first 
article of compact, on religious liberty, generally applicable?101  Why, in other 
words, protect a resident of Ohio from being “molested on account of his mode 
of worship, or religious sentiments,”102 but not a resident of Pennsylvania? 
Additionally, if the articles of compact are nothing more than a Federal 
statutory enactment, they establish protections, in several cases, that were 
initially inconsistent with, and were later duplicative of, provisions of the 
fundamental documents of the national government.  For example, if the second 
article of compact created Federal statutory habeas corpus and trial by jury 
protections applicable to Federal courts, it initially did so at a time—under the 
Articles of Confederation—when there were no Federal courts in which such 
protections would be effective.103  And it continued to do so—as the Northwest 
Ordinance was slightly modified to conform to the new Constitution, and then 
as the articles of compact were made applicable to additional territories—when 
 
97. Id. § 1. 
98. Id. § 14. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. § 14, art. VI. 
101. Id. § 14, art. I. 
102. Id.  
103. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778.  The Articles of Confederation did not provide for 
a judiciary. 
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such protections duplicated the habeas corpus and trial by jury protections of 
the Constitution.104 
Finally, if the Northwest Ordinance is simply a Federal statute, how could 
the Confederation Congress have justified legislating in areas, such as the 
legality of slavery and the protection of the religious liberty interests of citizens, 
over which the Articles of Confederation gave it no authority?105 
Might the Northwest Ordinance have been a statutory enactment of the 
Northwest Territory and the states to be created out of it?  Such a reading 
encounters the conceptual problem that the articles of covenant would 
constitute the enactments of legislative bodies that did not exist at the time the 
Northwest Ordinance was passed.  The reading also is inconsistent with the 
provisions of the first twelve sections of the Northwest Ordinance, which are 
clearly Federal provisions for the organization of the territory and states.  The 
reading is also inconsistent with the language of Section 14, that the articles of 
compact are “articles of compact, between the original States and the people 
and States in the said territory.”106 
In Pollard v. Hagan, Justice McKinley also identified a contractual 
possibility, that the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact “operate as a 
contract between the parties.”107  If the statutory model is not correct, is the 
contractual model more compelling?   
The notion of the articles of compact as a contract is more consistent than 
the statutory model with the language in Section 14: “[T]hat the following 
articles shall be considered as articles of compact, between the original States 
and the people and States in the said territory.”108  The contractual model 
reading of this text might be that the articles of compact are an agreement 
between two parties: the original states on one hand, and the people and States 
in the said territory on the other.   
 
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases or Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”); 
id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); id. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).   
105. The Articles of Confederation reserved to the states all powers not expressly delegated to 
the United States. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778, art. II (“Each state retains its sovereignty, 
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
confederation, expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”).  Nowhere in the 
text do the Articles of Confederation mention slavery or religious liberty, much less expressly delegate 
power over slavery and religious liberty to the United States. 
106. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
107. 44 U.S. 212, 224 (1845). 
108. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
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But if the articles of compact are such a bilateral contract, why is the first 
party “the original States” and not “the United States in Congress 
assembled”?109  Especially since the articles of compact are said to be “ordained 
and declared, by the authority” of “the United States in Congress 
assembled”?110  Further, if the Northwest Ordinance as a whole is such a 
bilateral contract, what of the first twelve sections that provide for the creation 
and organization of one of the parties?   
There exists a third possibility, one not identified by Justice McKinley.  The 
Northwest Ordinance articles of compact could be precisely what the 
Confederation Congress called them: articles of compact creating a new 
political relationship among the parties.  This construction is supported by the 
meaning the authors would have attached to the concept of a “compact,”111 and 
by the language of the Northwest Ordinance itself. 
Professor Andrew Cunningham McLaughlin clarified the concept in a work 
published in 1900.  He started his analysis with the observation that:  
[I]n the Revolutionary period men believed that society 
originated in compact . . . .  To secure the rights of life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness governments were supposed to 
have been “instituted among men, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed.”  These doctrines were 
living, actual ideas to the men of one hundred and twenty-five 
years ago.112 
Professor McLaughlin asserted that the same ideas informed the thoughts 
and actions of those involved “during the early constitutional period and for 
many years after the establishment of the United States.”113  But, he observed 
in 1900, “[t]he supposition that society originated in compact is now discarded 
and with it the notion that man ever existed in a state of nature possessed of all 
rights.”114 
 
109. Id. §§ 1, 14. 
110. Id. 
111. Andrew C. McLaughlin, Social Compact and Constitutional Construction, 5 AM. HIST. 
REV. 467 (1900), https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/5/3/467/102994 
[https://perma.cc/CEX9-Y8A9] [hereinafter McLaughlin, Social Compact].  Professor McLaughlin 
was an authority on American Constitutional history who taught at the University of Michigan and the 
University of Chicago. Andrew C. McLaughlin Biography, AM. HIST. ASS’N, 
https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/presidential-
addresses/andrew-c-mclaughlin/andrew-c-mclaughlin-biography [https://perma.cc/5Y8H-5QAG] 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2019). 
112. McLaughlin, Social Compact, supra note 111, at 467.  
113. Id. at 468.   
114. Id. at 469. 
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But to understand the writings of the period after the Revolution, 
McLaughlin asserted, we need to understand their method of thinking.115  And 
that method of thinking was what he termed “the compact philosophy”: 
An examination of the writings of the period seems to 
demonstrate that men approached the subject at hand—the 
establishment of a new constitution and government—guided 
by the ideas of the compact philosophy . . . .  [A]s far as one 
can find a consistent principle, it is this, that by compact of the 
most solemn and original kind a new political organization and 
a new indissoluble unit was being reared in America.116 
As seen by Professor McLaughlin, the contract philosophy had three 
elements relevant to interpretation of compacts written by its adherents: 
To the compact philosophy . . . may be said to belong three 
ideas which were of influence in our constitutional history: 
(1) The state is artificial and founded on agreement; (2) Law is 
not the expression of the will of a superior, but obtains its force 
from consent; a man can indissolubly bind himself; 
(3) Sovereignty is divisible.117 
The compact philosophy allowed for variations.  For example, as to the 
matter of who were the parties to the compact, there were variations: 
The compact was sometimes spoken of as a compact between 
the individuals of America in their most original and primary 
character; sometimes it was looked on as a compact between 
groups of individuals, each group surrendering a portion of its 
self-control and forming a new order or unity just as society 
itself was constituted.118 
To adherents of the compact philosophy, the creation of the Northwest 
Territory and the subsequent creation of states out of that territory would have 
presented a conceptual challenge.  The original states, the compact philosophy 
provided, were created by the agreement of their inhabitants, who existed in a 
 
115. Id. at 471–72 (“[I]f we seek to follow out historically the interpretation of the Constitution 
or to find out what men thought of it at the beginning, we must get into their attitude of mind an 
understand their method of thinking.”). 
116. Id. at 472. 
117. Id. at 470. 
118. Id. at 472.  Or, as Professor McLaughlin observed: 
Those who likened the Constitution to a social compact seem to have had two 
ideas somewhat different in character.  Some of them had in mind the 
combination of each person with every other in the establishment of a new society 
and body politic; others thought of thirteen bodies of individuals each yielding up 
a portion of its self-control and thus forming a new unity as men do when 
organizing a simple state or society. 
Id. at 480. 
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state of nature.119  But the Northwest Territory was the property of the national 
government.  The Northwest Territory hardly existed in a state of nature; the 
first twelve sections of the Ordinance were the detailed plan for its territorial 
and then state government.   
How might one approach the compact philosophy in writing the articles of 
compact?  One way would be to make the agreement among parties the closest 
one could to the theoretical state of nature.  As to the existing states, to frame 
the agreement as being by the states, not the Confederation.  As to the new 
territory, to frame the agreement as being by the people of the Northwest 
Territory and, secondarily, by the states to be created out of the Territory.120  
Such a construction would implement the compact philosophy.  This is 
precisely what the Confederation Congress enacted: “[A]rticles of compact, 
between the original States and the people and States in the said territory.”121 
Treating the thirteenth and fourteenth sections of the Northwest Ordinance 
as compacts among the original states, the people of the Northwest Territory, 
and the states to be created out of the Territory, is to assign them a role far more 
foundational than that of a typical statute or bilateral contract.  It is to equate 
the articles of compact with the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, 
as the fundamental documents of “a time when governments were in process of 
construction and new states were forming.”122  But one has only to consult the 
introduction to the articles of compact to understand that this was exactly the 
task the Confederation Congress undertook: 
[F]or extending the fundamental principles of civil and 
religious liberty, which form the basis whereupon these 
republics, their laws and constitutions, are erected; to fix and 
establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, 
and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in 
 
119. Id. at 480. 
“[The Constitution] is, in its very introduction, declared to be a compact between 
the people of the United States as individuals; and it is to be ratified by the people 
at large, in their capacity as individuals; all which, it was said would be quite right 
and proper, if there were no state governments, if all the people of this continent 
were in a state of nature, and we were forming one national government for them 
as individuals; and is nearly the same as was done in most of the states, when they 
formed their governments over the people who composed them.” 
Id. (quoting Luther Martin’s Letter, in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, at 344, 360 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)). 
120. The notion of a compact with the people of the Northwest Territory may seem unusual to 
contemporary readers, but it should be remembered that the same year the Northwest Ordinance was 
enacted, the Constitution was ordained and established by “the People of the United States.” U.S. 
CONST. pmbl. 
121. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
122. McLaughlin, Social Compact, supra note 111, at 468. 
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the said territory . . . .123 
Support for the compact philosophy is found in the precursors to the 
Ordinance of 1787.  A March 1, 1784 report to the Confederation Congress 
introduced provisions that would—with significant alterations—become the 
fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 
with the language: “Provided that both the temporary & permanent 
governments be established on these principles as their basis.”124  But the draft 
included the compact construction: 
That the preceding articles shall be formed into a Charter of 
Compact, shall be duly executed by the President of the U.S. 
in Congress assembled under his hand and the seal of the 
United States, shall be promulgated and shall stand as 
fundamental constitutions between the thirteen original 
states & those now newly described . . . .125 
The Ordinance of 1784,126 “the first positive legislation on the subject of 
the government of the northwest lands,”127 incorporated the draft language with 
only minor variations: 
That the preceding articles shall be formed into a charter of 
compact; shall be duly executed by the President of the United 
States in Congress assembled, under his hand, and the seal of 
the United States; shall be promulgated; and shall stand as 
fundamental constitutions between the thirteen original states, 
and each of the several states now newly described . . . .128  
As Merriam observed, “[t]he articles of this ordinance were made a 
compact between the original United States and each new State.”129   
Merriam pointed out, referring to the Ordinance of 1784, that “Jefferson’s 
form of the statement of this compact did not make the people of the States a 
party to it.”130  The Ordinance of 1787 made that change, providing that the 
articles of compact “shall be considered as articles of compact, between the 
original States and the people and States in the said territory.”131  This brought 
the structure of the articles of compact even closer to the compact philosophy. 
 
123. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 13. 
124. Merriam, supra note 47, at 309. 
125. Id. at 310.  
126. The Ordinance of 1784, NATI’L ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-06-02-0420-0006 [https://perma.cc/2UMB-
GXSL] (last updated Jan. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Ordinance of 1784]. 
127. Merriam, supra note 47, at 312. 
128. Ordinance of 1784, supra note 126. 
129. Merriam, supra note 47, at 313. 
130. Id. at 329. 
131. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14.  
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Once the articles of compact are understood to be within the compact 
philosophy, the remaining points of interpretation fall into place.  If the articles 
of compact are a compact among the original states and the people and states 
of the Northwest Territory, the term and amendment provisions—“forever 
remain unalterable, unless by common consent”—can be seen to be 
appropriate.  The mechanism was the same as provided in the Articles of 
Confederation, which allowed for amendment only upon the common consent 
of all the states.132   
One potentially confusing aspect of the articles of compact might be traced 
to the compact philosophy.  Section 14 provides that “the original States” are 
parties to the articles of compact.133  When the Northwest Ordinance was 
enacted in 1787, the Union included only the original thirteen states.134  This 
was also true in 1789, when Congress passed the harmonization amendment to 
conform the Northwest Ordinance to the newly-ratified Constitution.  The 
harmonization amendment did not modify the “original States” formulation.135  
What, then, of the states that joined the Union following the original thirteen 
states, but which were not part of the Northwest Territory?  For example, 
Vermont, which joined the Union in 1791.  What if, as Ohio was poised to join 
the Union in 1803, it had wanted to alter the articles of compact as applied to 
it.  Would alteration “by common consent” have included Vermont?  It would 
have been consistent with the compact philosophy to exclude Vermont, since it 
was not a party to the original compact between the original thirteen states and 
the people of the Northwest Territory.  The language of Section 14 provided for 
future developments in another respect when it included as future parties the 
“States in the said territory.”136  Had the drafters intended to include states 
admitted after the original thirteen from outside the Northwest Territory, the 
 
132. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778, art. XIII (“[N]or shall any alteration at any time 
hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, 
and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”). 
133. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
134. Eleven of the original thirteen states ratified the Articles of Confederation within the first 
year.  The last of the original thirteen states took over three years to ratify.  The states, and their 
respective ratification dates, were as follows: South Carolina (February 5, 1778), New York (February 
6, 1778), Rhode Island (February 9, 1778), Connecticut (February 12, 1778), Georgia (February 26, 
1778), New Hampshire (March 4, 1778), Pennsylvania (March 5, 1778), Massachusetts (March 10, 
1778), North Carolina (April 5, 1778), New Jersey (November 19, 1778), Virginia (December 15, 
1778), Delaware (February 1, 1779), and Maryland (January 30, 1781). FRANKLIN BENJAMIN HOUGH, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: COMPRISING CONSTITUTION OF EACH STATE OF THE UNION AND THE 
UNITED STATES 10 (1872).  The fourteenth state, Vermont, was not admitted until 1791, almost four 
years after the Northwest Ordinance was enacted. Statehood Status, supra note 11. 
135. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).  
136. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
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provision could have read: “[A]s articles of compact between the original 
States, the people and States in the said territory, and any States admitted from 
territories other than the said territory.”137  But that is not what the 
Confederation Congress provided. 
The amendment provision of the articles of compact presents another 
potentially confusing question.  Under the Northwest Ordinance, alterations of 
the articles of compact require “common consent.”138  The language should be 
read to require unanimity among the parties to the compact, thus all of the 
original thirteen states and not the Union including after-admitted, non-
Northwest-Territory states. 
Some evidence of the intent of the Confederation Congress, and some 
support for the compact philosophy, can be gained by looking at the 
development of the language on amendment.  In a March 1, 1784 draft, the 
substantive provisions were termed a “Charter of Compact,” which was made 
“unalterable but by the joint consent of the U.S. in Congress assembled and of 
the particular state within which such alteration is to be made.”139  This 
construction differed from the 1787 Ordinance in two important respects.  
Although the charter is set up “as fundamental constitutions between the 
thirteen original states & those now newly described,”140 in terms of 
amendment, the charter is set up as a bilateral agreement.  The Federal party 
was “the U.S. in Congress assembled,”141 not “the original States.”142  The 
Northwest Territory party was “the particular state within which such alteration 
is to be made,”143 not “the people and States in the said territory.”144  The 
Ordinance of 1784 adopted the draft formulation with only minor changes.145 
 
137. The statutes that incorporated by reference the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact did 
not modify the “original States” language. E.g., Act of Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 3 Stat. 323, 329 
(“[T]he inhabitants of said Territory shall be entitled to enjoy all and singular the rights, privileges and 
advantages granted and secured to the people of the territory of the United States north-west of the 
River Ohio, by the articles of compact contained in the ordinance for the government of said territory, 
on the thirteenth day of July, seventeen hundred and eighty-seven; and shall be subject to all the 
conditions, and restrictions, and prohibitions in said articles of compact imposed upon the people of 
said territory . . . .”). 
138. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
139. Merriam, supra note 47, at 310. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
143. Merriam, supra note 47, at 310. 
144. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
145. Ordinance of 1784, supra note 126 (providing that the “charter of compact . . . shall stand 
as fundamental constitutions between the thirteen original states, and each of the several states now 
newly described, unalterable from and after the sale of any part of the territory of such state, pursuant 
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Interestingly, while the Confederation Congress provided that amendments 
of the Charter of Compact could be authorized by “the United States in 
Congress assembled,”146 it adopted a much more complicated construction 
when dealing with the admission of new states in the same document: 
[S]uch state shall be admitted . . . provided that the consent of 
so many states in Congress is first obtained as may at the time 
be competent to such admission.  And in order to adapt the said 
articles of confederation to the state of Congress when its 
numbers shall be thus increased, it shall be proposed to the 
legislatures of the states, originally parties thereto, to require 
the assent of two thirds of the United States in Congress 
assembled, in all those cases wherein by the said articles, the 
assent of nine states is now required, which being agreed to by 
them shall be binding on the new states.147 
With the Ordinance of 1787, the Confederation Congress adopted a very 
different construction, one more in line with the compact philosophy.  It 
specified that the articles of compact were “between the original States and the 
people and States in the said territory” and provided that the articles of compact 
were to “forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent.”148 
How might the consent of the original states have been secured?  How 
might it be secured today?  When the Northwest Ordinance was enacted, the 
original states formulation conformed to the voting provisions of the national 
legislature.  The Articles of Confederation provided that “[i]n determining 
questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shall have one 
vote.”149  And while it is true that normal measures passed with less than 
unanimity,150 amendments to the Articles of Confederation—which were, one 
could argue, analogous to amendments of the Northwest Ordinance articles of 
compact—required a unanimous vote.151   
But with ratification of the Constitution, the voting provisions of the 
national legislature changed to count the votes of individual representatives and 
senators, not states.152  And Congress includes states in addition to the original 
thirteen states.  Presumably, the common consent of the original states would 
 
to this resolve, but by the joint consent of the United States in Congress assembled, and of that 
particular state within which such alteration is proposed to be made”). 
146. Id.  
147. Id.  
148. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
149. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778, art. V, § 4. 
150. Id. art. V, § 4 (one vote per state), art. IX, § 6 (majority of states for specified votes), and 
art. X (nine states for specified votes). 
151. Id. art. XIII. 
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
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today be secured by votes of the individual legislatures of the original thirteen 
states. 
If the articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance are compacts among 
the original states and the people of the Northwest Territory and the states to be 
formed out of the Territory, one final operational question arises.  Are the 
substantive provisions of the articles of compact self-executing or are they 
executory?  That is, were they effective upon passage of the Northwest 
Ordinance or did they require some additional action—perhaps action by the 
Territorial or state legislatures—to become effective.   
We are comfortable categorizing the rules by which governments act as 
being constitutions, laws, and administrative regulations.  We know how each 
is promulgated.153  The articles of compact do not fit easily into any of the 
familiar categories.  The language of Northwest Ordinance Section 13, the 
introduction to the articles of compact, makes it clear that the articles of 
compact are controlling over, but apart from, laws and constitutions.154  The 
articles of compact are “to fix and establish those [fundamental principles of 
civil and religious liberty] as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and 
governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in said territory.”155 
The language of the articles of compact is consistent with those provisions 
being self-executing, not merely executory.  Had the authors intended the 
articles of compact to merely document the agreement of people of the 
territories and the states to take actions in the future to implement the 
substantive provisions, they could have done so.  For example, the first article 
of compact could have been written: 
Art. 1.  The people and States in the said territory agree to adopt 
a constitution and enact laws which shall guarantee that no 
person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, 
shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or 
religious sentiments, in the said territory. 
But it was not.  The wording of the first article of compact contains not even 
a hint that the provision is anything but self-executing.156 
In the same way, the sixth article of compact could have been written to 
incorporate the same type of executory language: 
Art. 6.  The people and States in the said territory agree to adopt 
a constitution and enact laws which shall guarantee there shall 
 
153. Schoolhouse Rock, How a Bill Becomes a Law, YOUTUBE (May 20, 2010) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Otbml6WIQPo [https://perma.cc/8NYH-4CYK]. 
154. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 13. 
155. Id.  
156. Id. § 14, art. I. 
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be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said 
territory, other than in the punishment of crimes whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted: Provided, always, That 
any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service 
is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such 
fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person 
claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid. 
But it was not.  The wording of the sixth article of compact is incompatible 
with the provision is anything but self-executing.157 
It is acknowledged that one article of compact contains language that is 
executory in form.  The third article begins with language that is aspirational: 
“Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and 
the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be 
encouraged.”158  It continues with language that is self-executing: “The utmost 
good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and 
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their 
property, rights, and liberty they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in 
just and lawful wars authorized by Congress.”159  The provision concludes with 
language that is fairly read as executory: “[B]ut laws founded in justice and 
humanity shall, from time to time, be made, for preventing wrongs being done 
to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.”160  This clause 
does not alter the assessment that the articles of compact, taken as a whole, are 
clearly self-executing and not executory in form.161 
The debates leading up to enactment of the Northwest Ordinance were 
consistent with the articles of compact being self-executing, not merely 
executory.  For example, Rufus King’s proposed language on slavery read 
“there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the states . . . 
and that this regulation shall be an article of compact, and remain a fundamental 
principle of the constitutions between the thirteen original states and each of 
the states described in the said resolve.”162  The committee report leading to the 
Ordinance of 1787 contained language that “the inhabitants of such districts 
 
157. Id. at § 14, art. VI. 
158. Id. at § 14, art. III. 
159. Id.  
160. Id.  
161. The second article of compact also contains language about future legislation, providing 
“[T]hat no law ought ever to be made or have force in the said territory, that shall, in any manner 
whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts, or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud 
previously formed.” Id. § 14, art. II.  But properly considered, the language is not executory because it 
operates as an immediately effective ban on such legislation, not a promise that any legislation shall 
be enacted. 
162. Merriam, supra note 47, at 314–15. 
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shall always be entitled to the benefits of the act of habeas corpus and of the 
trial by jury.”163  The treatment of the articles of compact by the courts prior to 
Strader is also consistent with those provisions being self-executing, not merely 
executory.164 
The Northwest Ordinance articles of compact are best understood as the 
result of a compact between the original states and the people of the Northwest 
Territory and the states created out of the Territory.  They are self-executing 
protections, forever unalterable except by the consent of all of the parties.  But 
that understanding was challenged by Permoli, Pollard, and Chief Justice 
Taney’s error in Strader, to which we now turn. 
IV. STRADER V. GRAHAM: THE SUPREME COURT 
A decade after Henry, Reuben, and George escaped Kentucky on the 
steamboat Pike, the appeal of Dr. Christopher Graham’s judgment against the 
Pike’s owners was heard by the United States Supreme Court.   
The procedural posture of the case was straightforward.  After prolonged 
proceedings in the courts of the Commonwealth, Dr. Graham obtained a decree 
against the owners of the Pike, Jacob Strader and James Gorman, its captain, 
John Armstrong, and the steamboat itself, for $3,000 in damages.165  Strader, 
Gorman, and Armstrong appealed to the Supreme Court.166  Their assertion was 
that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the appeal under Section 25 of the 
 
163. Id. at 319.   
164. See, e.g., Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. 215, 230 (1847) (“The ordinance prohibited the 
existence of slavery in the territory northwest of the river Ohio . . . .”); Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F. 
Cas. 939, 941 (D. Ohio 1838) (No. 13,245) (“That this ordinance was obligatory in all its parts at the 
time of its adoption, no one can doubt . . . .”); Jarrot v. Jarrot, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 1, 23 (1845) (“It can not 
be denied, but that the ordinance of 1787, in the most express terms, prohibited the future existence of 
slavery in the territory; it was enacted as an organic law for the government of the territory . . . .”); 
Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 22 (Iowa 1849) (“The legislature could not curtail any rights conferred 
upon the people by the ordinance, nor confer any rights withheld.”); Scott v. Detroit Young Men’s 
Soc’y’s Lessee, 1 Doug. 119, 133 (Mich. 1843) (“The right, and the power to form such a constitution 
and government, was as absolutely and irrevocably vested in, and secured to, the inhabitants of 
Michigan, by the compact contained in the ordinance of 1787 . . . .”); Merry v. Tiffin, 1 Mo. 725, 725 
(1827) (“The ordinance is positive, that slavery cannot exist . . . .”); Ruffner v. McLenan, 16 Ohio 639, 
641 (1847) (“This ordinance has ever been considered as the organic law of the territory northwest of 
the Ohio, as much so as is the constitution of a state the organic law of that state.”); Hutchinson v. 
Thompson, 9 Ohio 52, 62 (1839) (“But when application for admission into the union was made by 
the people inhabiting the eastern part of the territory, modifications in several parts of the 
ordinance were asked for, and they were granted by the United States as one party, to the state, as the 
other.  This seems to show, that the people of Ohio have, so far, treated the articles of compact as of 
perpetual obligation.”). 
165. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 93 (1851). 
166. Id. 
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Judiciary Act, which provided such jurisdiction where the highest court of a 
state ruled against the validity of an exercise of Federal authority.167   
The Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over a claim that Henry and 
Reuben had become free by virtue of the provisions of the state constitutions of 
Indiana and Ohio.168  The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court depended on the 
claim that Henry and Reuben were free before they boarded the Pike based on 
the sixth article of compact of the Northwest Ordinance.169 
In his opinion, Chief Justice Taney first noted the assertion that the slaves 
had gained their freedom by virtue of their travel to and employment in the free 
state of Ohio and concluded: “But this question is not before us.”170  His 
analysis started with the proposition that Kentucky had the right to determine 
the status of persons within its borders: 
Every State has an undoubted right to determine the status, or 
domestic and social condition, of the persons domiciled within 
its territory; except in so far as the powers of the States in this 
respect are restrained, or duties and obligations imposed upon 
them, by the Constitution of the United States.  There is 
nothing in the Constitution of the United States that can in any 
degree control the law of Kentucky upon this subject.171 
Taney’s analysis then rejected the assertion that the status of Henry and 
Reuben depended upon their status under the laws of Ohio: 
And the condition of the negroes, therefore, as to freedom or 
slavery, after their return, depended altogether upon the laws 
of that State, and could not be influenced by the laws of Ohio.  
It was exclusively in the power of Kentucky to determine for 
itself whether their employment in another State should or 
should not make them free on their return.  The [Kentucky] 
Court of Appeals have determined, that by the laws of the State 
they continued to be slaves.  And their judgment upon this 
point is, upon this writ of error, conclusive upon this court, and 
we have no jurisdiction over it.172 
 
167. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, § 25 (1789) (“That a final judgment or decree in 
any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be 
had . . . where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any 
State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, 
and the decision is in favour of such their validity . . . may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed 
in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error . . . .”). 
168. OHIO CONST. of 1803, art. VIII, § 2; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. XI, § 7. 
169. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. VI. 
170. Strader, 51 U.S. at 93. 
171. Id. at 93–94. 
172. Id. at 94. 
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Chief Justice Taney then turned to the assertion that the involvement of the 
Northwest Ordinance grounded the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: 
But it seems to be supposed in the argument, that the law of 
Ohio upon this subject has some peculiar force by virtue of the 
Ordinance of 1787, for the government of the Northwestern 
Territory, Ohio being one of the States carved out of it.173 
Before discussing the question of whether the Northwest Ordinance 
remained in effect, Chief Justice Taney noted the substance of the sixth article 
of compact and the language of the Northwest Ordinance providing that it 
should “for ever remain unalterable unless by common consent.”174  He 
concluded that even if the slavery article of compact had still been in effect, it 
would not have controlled the matter under consideration: 
If this proposition [that the Northwest Ordinance remained in 
effect] could be maintained, it would not alter the question.  For 
the regulation of Congress, under the old Confederation or the 
present Constitution, for the government of a particular 
territory, could have no force beyond its limits.  It certainly 
could not restrict the power of the States within their respective 
territories; nor in any manner interfere with their laws and 
institutions; nor give this court any control over them.  The 
Ordinance in question, if still in force, could have no more 
operation than the laws of Ohio in the State of Kentucky, and 
could not influence the decision upon the rights of the master 
or slaves in that State, nor give this court jurisdiction upon this 
subject.175 
His core assertion was that the Northwest Ordinance was no longer in 
effect, and thus could not give the Supreme Court jurisdiction.  
The argument assumes that the six articles which that 
Ordinance declares to be perpetual are still in force in the States 
since formed within the Territory, and admitted into the 
Union. . . .  But it has been settled by judicial decision in this 
court, that this Ordinance is not in force.176 
To support his assertion that the Northwest Ordinance was no longer 
effective in the states created out of the Northwest Territory, Chief Justice 
 
173. Id.  
174. Id.  
175. Id.  
176. Id. at 94. 
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Taney cited two Supreme Court precedents Permoli v. City of New Orleans177 
and Pollard v. Hagan.178 
The first case upon which Chief Justice Taney relied in his Strader opinion 
was Permoli, a challenge to a New Orleans ordinance which restricted open-
casket funerals.179  Father Bernard Permoli, a Catholic priest, was fined and 
appealed claiming that the ordinance violated both the Free Exercise Clause of 
the Constitution and the first article of compact of the legislation creating the 
Orleans Territory.180   
Writing for the Court, Justice Catron first rejected Father Permoli’s claim 
that the municipal regulation of open-casket funerals violated the Free Exercise 
Clause of the Constitution: 
The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens 
of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to 
the state constitutions and laws; nor is there any inhibition 
imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect 
on the states.181 
Justice Catron then turned to Father Permoli’s second claim, that 
enforcement of the municipal open-casket funeral ordinance against him 
violated the first article of compact of the Northwest Ordinance—“[n]o person, 
demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested 
on account of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments.”182  Father Permoli 
claimed the protection of the Northwest Ordinance’s first article of compact 
 
177. 44 U.S. 589, 589 (1845). 
178. 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
179. Permoli, 44 U.S. at 589–90. 
180. Id. at 609–10. 
181. Id. at 609.  Both were decided in 1845: Permoli in March and Pollard in February. 
182. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. I. 
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because that provision had been made applicable to New Orleans under the 
terms of the statutes that created the Mississippi183 and Orleans184 territories.  
Justice Catron described the articles of compact: 
In the ordinance, there are terms of compact declared to be 
thereby established, between the original states, and the people 
in the states afterwards to be formed north-west of the Ohio, 
unalterable, unless by common consent . . . .185 
Justice Catron’s reading of the articles of compact was complicated.  
During the pre-statehood period, when the areas were part of the Northwest 
Territory, Justice Catron seems to have believed the articles were simply 
statutory enactments of the national government, “acts of Congress organizing, 
 
183. The April 7, 1798 action of the Congress creating the Mississippi Territory (which 
eventually included the area included in present-day Mississippi and Alabama) provided: 
That from and after the establishment of the said government, the people of the 
aforesaid territory, shall be entitled to and enjoy all and singular the rights, 
privileges and advantages granted to the people of the territory of the United 
States, northwest of the river Ohio, in and by the aforesaid ordinance of the 
thirteenth day of July, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, 
in as full and ample a manner as the same are possessed and enjoyed by the people 
of the said last mentioned territory. 
Act of Apr. 7, 1798, ch. 28, § 6, 1 Stat. 549, 550. 
Congress specifically excluded from application to the Mississippi Territory the sixth article of 
compact of the Northwest Ordinance, the prohibition of slavery: 
[T]he President of the United States is hereby authorized to establish therein a 
government in all respects similar to that now exercised in the territory northwest 
of the river Ohio, excepting and excluding the last article of the ordinance made 
for the government thereof by the late Congress on the thirteenth day of July one 
thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven . . . . 
Id. at 550 (emphasis added).   
184. The provisions of the Northwest Ordinance were extended to the Orleans territory in 1805 
by a statute that authorized the President “to establish within the territory of Orleans, a government in 
all respects similar, (except as herein otherwise provided,) to that now exercised in the Mississippi 
territory.” Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 23, § 1, 2 Stat. 322, 322.  Under that enactment, “the inhabitants of 
the territory of Orleans shall be entitled to and enjoy all the rights, privileges, and advantages secured 
by the said ordinance, and now enjoyed by the people of the Mississippi territory.” Id.  The statute 
specifically excluded from effect in the Orleans Territory two of the articles of compact of the 
Northwest Ordinance; the second article on descent and distributions of estates, and the sixth article 
on slavery. Id. § 5, at 322. 
185. Permoli, 44 U.S. at 610.  It might be noted that Justice Catron misstates the parties to the 
articles of compact: while on one side there are “the original States,” on the other the Northwest 
Ordinance stipulates “the people and States in the said territory,” while Justice Catron states it as “the 
people in the states afterwards to be formed north-west of the Ohio . . . .”  Compare id. (“[T]he people 
in the states afterwards to be formed north-west of the Ohio . . . .”), with Northwest Ordinance, supra 
note 2, § 14 (“[T]he people and States in the said territory . . . .”). 
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in part, the territorial government.”186  He thus ignored the language and history 
of the articles of compact. 
After statehood, Justice Catron believed that the articles of compact “had 
no further force, after the adoption of the state constitution.”187  Under this 
reasoning, the admission of Louisiana into the Union swept away all prior acts 
of Congress with respect to civil and religious liberties in the area admitted: 
So far as they conferred political rights, and secured civil and 
religious liberties, (which are political rights,) the laws of 
Congress were all superseded by the state constitution; nor is 
any part of them in force, unless they were adopted by the 
constitution of Louisiana, as laws of the state.188 
Justice Catron’s reading, that the guarantees of the Northwest Ordinance 
articles of compact were merely “secured to the people of the Orleans territory, 
during its existence,” and ceased to have effect once the initial constitution and 
laws of the newly created states were approved by Congress through admission 
of the states.189  After statehood, the substantive provisions of the articles of 
compact provided merely a suggestion of the checklist Congress might, or 
might not, use in evaluating the new state’s proposed constitution: 
All Congress intended, was to declare in advance, to the people 
of the territory, the fundamental principles their constitution 
should contain; this was every way proper under the 
circumstances: the instrument having been duly formed, and 
presented, it was for the national legislature to judge whether 
it contained the proper principles, and to accept it if it did; or 
reject it if it did not.190 
But the plain language of the Northwest Ordinance was not so limited; 
under its terms the articles of compact were “to fix and establish those 
principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and governments, which 
forever hereafter shall be formed in the said territory.”191  Accordingly, the 
articles of compact themselves were created to “forever remain unalterable.”192 
Having misread the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact, Justice 
Catron was positioned to reject Father Permoli’s claim: 
It is not possible to maintain that the United states hold in trust, 
by force of the ordinance, for the people of Louisiana, all the 
 
186. Permoli, 44 U.S. at 610. 
187. Id.  
188. Id.  
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 609. 
191. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 13 (emphasis added). 
192. Id. § 14. 
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great elemental principles, or any one of them, contained in the 
ordinance, and secured to the people of the Orleans territory, 
during its existence.  It follows, no repugnance could arise 
between the ordinance of 1787 and an act of the legislature of 
Louisiana, or a city regulation founded on such act; and 
therefore this court has no jurisdiction on the last ground 
assumed, more than on the preceding ones.  In our judgment, 
the question presented by the record is exclusively of state 
cogni[z]ance, and equally so in the old states and the new ones; 
and that the writ of error must be dismissed.193 
The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 
Judiciary Act.194 
The second case upon which Chief Justice Taney relied in his Strader 
opinion was Pollard v. Hagan, a navigable waters case arising out of 
Alabama.195  The plaintiffs in Pollard claimed title to a plot of land in Mobile 
by virtue of “a patent from the United States for the premises in question,” 
together with two acts of Congress confirming plaintiffs’ title.196  The 
defendants asserted that the land in question had been “covered by water of the 
Mobile river at common high tide” until 1822 or 1823.197 
As Alabama was admitted to the Union on December 14, 1819,198 it was 
defendants’ claim that the patent from the United States was ineffective to 
convey title.199  The trial court so charged the jury: 
“The court charged the jury, that if they believed the premises 
sued for were below usual high water-mark, at the time 
Alabama was admitted into the union, then the act of Congress, 
and the patent in pursuance thereof, could give the plaintiffs no 
title . . . .”200 
The jury found that the land was underwater at the time of statehood and 
found in favor of the defendants.201 
 
193. Permoli, 44 U.S. at 610. 
194. Id. 
195. 44 U.S. 212 (1845).  The opinion of the Court was by Justice John McKinley, who was 
himself from Alabama. 
196. Id. at 219. 
197. Id. at 220. 
198. Statehood Status, supra note 11. 
199. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 220. 
200. Id. (quoting the trial court). 
201. Id.  
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Plaintiffs’ challenge to the trial court ruling was based on the fourth article 
of compact of the Northwest Ordinance, which was made applicable to the 
Alabama Territory in 1817,202 and under which: 
[B]y the compact between the United States and Alabama, on 
her admission into the union, it was agreed, that the people of 
Alabama for ever disclaimed all right or title to the waste or 
unappropriated lands lying within the state, and that the same 
should remain at the sole disposal of the United States; and that 
all the navigable waters within the state should for ever remain 
public highways, and free to the citizens of that state and the 
United States, without any tax, duty, or impost, or toll therefor, 
imposed by that state.203 
Under the articles of compact, the Pollard court conceded: 
[T]he land under the navigable waters, and the public domain 
above high water, were alike reserved to the United States, and 
alike subject to be sold by them; and to give any other 
construction to these compacts, would be to yield up to 
Alabama, and the other new states, all the public lands within 
their limits.204 
Having reviewed the history of the territory, the Pollard court concluded 
that the authority of the United States—provided in the Northwest Ordinance 
to be “articles of compact between the original States and the people and States 
in the said territory and forever remain unalterable”—were merely 
“temporary:” 
We think a proper examination of this subject will show, that 
the United States never held any municipal sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, or right of soil in and to the territory, of which 
Alabama or any of the new states were formed; except for 
temporary purposes, and to execute the trusts created by the 
acts of the Virginia and Georgia legislatures, and the deeds of 
cession executed by them to the United States, and the trust 
created by the treaty with the French republic . . . ceding 
Louisiana.205 
Such a temporary grant of rights in the United States, the Pollard court 
concluded, was consistent with the intent of the parties: “[I]t was the intention 
of the parties to invest the United States with the eminent domain of the country 
 
202. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 59, § 1, 3 Stat. 371, 372 (establishing the Alabama Territory).  The 
Pollard court acknowledged the applicability of the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact to the 
Alabama Territory, excepting the sixth article of compact on slavery. 
203. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 220–21. 
204. Id. at 221. 
205. Id.  
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ceded, both national and municipal, for the purposes of temporary 
government.”206 
Justice McKinley interpreted that the articles of compact of the Northwest 
Ordinance under a statutory model, not under the contractual model he 
identified as the only alternative.  Justice McKinley did not address the reading 
of the articles of compact as being the product of a compact among the original 
states, the people of the Northwest Territory, and the states to be created out of 
the Territory, as the language of articles of compact provides.  His position was 
clear, at least as to navigable waters.  He declared “the agreement of the people 
inhabiting the new states . . . cannot operate as a contract between the parties, 
but is binding as a law.”207  But, Justice McKinley’s analysis continued, “all 
constitutional laws are binding on the people, in the new states and the old ones, 
whether they consent to be bound by them or not.”208  He concluded: “The 
proposition . . . that such a law cannot operate upon the subject-matter of its 
enactment, without the express consent of the people of the new state where it 
may happen to be, contains its own refutation, and requires no further 
examination.”209 
Having adopted the statutory model, Justice McKinley considered whether 
the imposition of such statutory provisions on the newly created states would 
be permissible.  Here, the Pollard court created the “equal footing” doctrine: 
When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal 
footing with the original states, she succeeded to all the rights 
of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which 
Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as 
this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the 
possession and under the control of the United States, for the 
temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the 
legislative acts connected with it.  Nothing remained to the 
United States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the 
public lands.210   
The related proposition to the equal footing doctrine is the assertion that the 
Federal government lacked the authority to exercise control over lands within 
a state: 
And, if an express stipulation had been inserted in the 
agreement, granting the municipal right of sovereignty and 
eminent domain to the United States, such stipulation would 
 
206. Id. at 222. 
207. Id. at 224. 
208. Id.  
209. Id. at 225. 
210. Id. at 223 (emphasis added). 
VESTAL, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2019  6:04 PM 
2019] THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE AND STRADER V. GRAHAM 1123 
have been void and inoperative; because the United States have 
no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, 
sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or 
elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly 
granted.211 
What of the articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance, which by their 
terms were to “forever remain unalterable”?212  The Pollard court found the 
United States lacked the Constitutional authority to exercise such authority, 
except on a temporary basis: 
The right of Alabama and every other new state to exercise all 
the powers of government, which belong to and may be 
exercised by the original states of the union, must be admitted, 
and remain unquestioned, except so far as they are, 
temporarily, deprived of control over the public lands.213 
Once the United States fulfilled its temporary charge, the theory provided, 
any national authority would disappear and the equal footing doctrine would be 
fulfilled: “Whenever the United States shall have fully executed these trusts, 
the municipal sovereignty of the new states will be complete, throughout their 
respective borders, and they, and the original states, will be upon an equal 
footing, in all respects whatever.”214 
But what of the mechanism established in the Northwest Ordinance 
allowing for modification of the articles of compact “by common consent”?215  
Justice McKinley simply recast the articles of compact to eliminate the 
“common consent” requirement.216  Congress had the authority “to make all 
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the 
United States.”217   
Having found that the articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance 
conferred no authority on the United States with respect to the ownership of 
public lands in Alabama, Justice McKinley found for the defendants.218 
But what of Alabama’s declaration, made when it was admitted to the 
Union, “that all navigable waters within the said state shall for ever remain 
 
211. Id.  
212. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
213. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 224. 
214. Id.  
215. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
216. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 224 (Article of compact “cannot operate as a contract between the 
parties, but is binding as a law.”). 
217. Id.  
218. Id. at 225 (“The supposed compact relied upon by the counsel for plaintiffs, conferred no 
authority, therefore, on Congress to pass the act granting to the plaintiffs the land in controversy.”). 
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public highways, free to the citizens of said state, and of the United States, 
without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor, imposed by the said state”?219  
Justice McKinley found that it “would be void if inconsistent with the 
Constitution of the United States,”220 but then determined that “[t]his supposed 
compact is . . . nothing more than a regulation of commerce, to that extent, 
among the several states,” consistent with Article 1, section 8 of the 
Constitution,221 “and can have no controlling influence in the decision of the 
case before us.”222 
Having recounted Permoli and Pollard, Chief Justice Taney turned to the 
assertion that the Northwest Ordinance was not then in force, and thus the 
Supreme Court could not have jurisdiction over the Pike matter based on its 
sixth article of compact.  Although his thinking was not clearly set forth, he 
seemed to be making three assertions.   
First, Chief Justice Taney believed that the articles of compact of the 
Northwest Ordinance ceased to be effective when each of the states created 
from the Northwest Territory was admitted to the Union.223  This was 
essentially the Permoli reasoning, that the articles of compact were superseded 
by the constitution of each state as it was admitted to the Union.224 
Second, Chief Justice Taney believed that the articles of compact of the 
Northwest Ordinance could not have been effective after the admission of the 
states created from the Northwest Territory because to do so would deny them 
admission on the same terms as the original states.225  This was the equal footing 
doctrine from Pollard.226 
Third, Chief Justice Taney argued that the ratification of the Constitution 
itself rendered the Northwest Ordinance of no further effect.227  This was a new 
argument, not found in Permoli or Pollard. 
All three of Chief Justice Taney’s arguments are incompatible with the 
language and history of the Northwest Ordinance. 
 
219. Id. at 229. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 230; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have the Power To lay and 
collect . . . Duties, Imposts and Excises, . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States; . . . [and] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
222. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230. 
223. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 95 (1851). 
224. Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589, 610 (1845). 
225. Strader, 51 U.S. at 95–96. 
226. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 224. 
227. Strader, 51 U.S. at 95. 
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A. The Northwest Ordinance Articles of Compact Ceased to Be Effective 
Upon the Admission of Each State 
Chief Justice Taney’s first argument was that the Northwest Ordinance 
ceased to be effective when each of the states created from the Northwest 
Territory was admitted to the Union, that the provisions were superseded by the 
constitutions of the admitted states.228  The argument was at odds with the 
language of the Ordinance and overplayed the authority he cited.229   
Chief Justice Taney’s argument in this respect does not withstand a close 
reading of the Northwest Ordinance itself, for clearly Congress intended it to 
have effect following the admission of the states.  Indeed, in the introduction to 
the articles of compact, Section 14 provides that the “articles shall be 
considered as articles of compact, between the original States and the people 
and States in the said territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by 
common consent.”230  Thus the articles of compact run between the original 
states, on the one hand, and the people of the Northwest Territory and the states 
formed out of the Northwest Territory, on the other. 
Additional evidence that Chief Justice Taney’s reading of the Northwest 
Ordinance was in error can be found in the articles of compact themselves.  The 
fourth article of compact provides: “The said territory, and the States which 
may be formed therein, shall forever remain a part of this Confederacy of the 
United States of America.”231  The same article of compact by its terms applies 
to the states to be created out of the Northwest Territory with respect to taxes232 
and to land grants by the Federal government.233  The fifth article of compact 
 
228. Id.  
229. One might argue that Permoli is not supportive of Chief Justice Taney’s argument in 
Strader because Justice Catron’s opinion in Permoli specifically limits the holding to the effect of 
Louisiana statehood and does not opine on the effect of Ohio statehood on the Northwest Ordinance: 
“[W]hat the force of the ordinance is north of the Ohio, we do not pretend to say.” Permoli, 44 U.S. at 
610.  But it is an argument that Chief Justice Taney countered in his Strader opinion:  
[T]he [Permoli] court held that the Ordinance ceased to be in force when 
Louisiana became a State, and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.  This 
opinion is, indeed, confined to the Territory in which the case arose.  But it is 
evident that the Ordinance cannot be in force in the States formed in the 
Northwestern Territory, and at the same time not in force in the States formed in 
the Southwestern Territory . . . . 
Strader, 51 U.S at 95. 
230. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14 (emphasis added). 
231. Id. § 14, art. IV (emphasis added). 
232. Id. (“[T]he taxes for paying their proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and 
direction of the legislatures of the district, or districts, or new States . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
233. Id. (“The legislatures of those districts, or new States, shall never interfere with the primary 
disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress assembled . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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contains language relating to the admission of new states out of the Northwest 
Territory, and contains a guarantee that those new states shall have a republican 
form of government: 
[W]henever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand 
free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted, by its 
delegates, into the Congress of the United States, on an equal 
footing with the original States, in all respects whatever; and 
shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State 
government: Provided, The constitution and government, so to 
be formed, shall be republican, and in conformity to the 
principles contained in these articles [of compact] . . . .234 
Although in writing his Strader opinion Chief Justice Taney relied upon 
Justice Catron’s Permoli opinion, Justice Catron significantly backed away 
from his earlier position when he wrote his concurrence in Strader.  Rather than 
reaffirm his Permoli analysis, that the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact 
were rendered ineffective in toto with the adoption of the state constitution, 
Justice Catron cast the process of Ohio adopting its constitution as an 
amendment of the sixth article of compact, by “common consent” as provided 
in the Ordinance.235  He started by misquoting the introductory language of 
Section 14: 
The Ordinance of 1787 provides that the six articles contained 
in it shall be unalterable, and remain a compact between the 
original States and the people of the Northwestern Territory, 
“unless altered by common consent.”236 
Of course, Section 14 does not speak only of “a compact between the 
original States and the people of the Northwestern Territory,” as Justice Catron 
asserted.  Section 14 provides for “articles of compact, between the original 
States and the people and States in the said territory.”237 
Justice Catron then noted that the sixth article of compact under the 
Northwest Ordinance includes two provisions regarding slavery.  The first, he 
said, “declares, that slavery shall be prohibited.”238  The second, he said, 
declares “that absconding slaves there found shall be surrendered to their 
 
234. Id. § 14, art. V. 
235. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 98 (1851) (Catron, J., concurring). 
236. Id. (Catron, J., concurring). 
237. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14 (emphasis added). 
238. Strader, 51 U.S. at 98 (Catron, J., concurring).  Justice Catron was paraphrasing; the first 
part of the sixth article of compact provides: “There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude 
in the said territory, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted.” Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. VI. 
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owners.”239  He noted that the original Ohio constitution included language 
adopting the first, but not the second Ordinance provision.  As the Ohio 
constitution was approved by Congress, this process, he claimed, constituted 
the alteration by common consent contemplated by the Northwest Ordinance: 
The constitution of Ohio incorporates the first part of the sixth 
article, but leaves out the second part.  The State constitution 
having received the sanction of Congress, the alteration was 
made by common consent, as this was the mode of consent 
contemplated by the compact; that is to say, by the States in 
Congress assembled, whether under the Confederation or 
present Constitution.240 
Justice Catron’s analysis continued as to the effect of Congress approving 
the Ohio constitution with only one of the two slavery provisions of the sixth 
article of compact: 
The power to alter necessarily involves the power to annul, or 
to suspend; and when the State constitution of Ohio was 
assented to by Congress, the article stood suspended, or 
abolished, as an engagement among the States, and can now 
only be recognized as part of the organic State law.  And as this 
law is drawn in question here, no jurisdiction exists to examine 
the State decision.241 
It should be noted that Justice Catron’s position was not that the Northwest 
Ordinance in toto became ineffective as to Ohio upon congressional approval 
of its initial state constitution.  It was only that the sixth article of compact, on 
slavery, became ineffective: “[W]hen the State constitution of Ohio was 
assented to by Congress, the article stood suspended, or abolished.”242  As to 
the other five articles of compact, Justice Catron’s position had evolved such 
since Permoli that he was unwilling to venture an opinion: “But in regard to 
 
239. Strader, 51 U.S. at 98 (Catron, J., concurring).  Justice Catron was paraphrasing; the second 
part of the sixth article of compact provides: “Provided always, That any person escaping into the 
same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive 
may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as 
aforesaid.” Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. VI.  One might have noted, although Justice 
Catron did not, that the Ordinance language would not, by its terms, have aided Dr. Christopher 
Graham had he intercepted Henry, Reuben, and George in Ohio since their “labor or service” was not 
“lawfully claimed in any one of the original States,” the Commonwealth of Kentucky having been 
admitted to the Union only in 1792 as the fifteenth state. Id. 
240. Strader, 51 U.S. at 98 (Catron, J., concurring).  The initial Ohio constitution did prohibit 
slavery: OHIO CONST. of 1803, art. VIII, § 2 (“There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude 
in this State, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted . . . .”). 
241. Strader, 51 U.S. at 98 (Catron, J., concurring). 
242. Id. (Catron, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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parts of the other five articles, I am unwilling to express any opinion, as no part 
of either is in any degree involved in this controversy.”243  
Justice Catron’s suggestion that congressional approval of the proposed 
Ohio constitution constituted an amendment of the Northwest Ordinance’s 
sixth article of compact is in error.  Section 14 of the Northwest Ordinance 
establishes the parties to the articles of compact as “the original States and the 
people and States in the said territory.”244  The “common consent” to alter the 
articles of compact would be the consent of all the parties.245  The 1803 vote of 
Congress to admit Ohio would have been insufficient to evidence such common 
consent for three reasons.  First, in 1803 Congress included representatives 
from three states admitted after the original thirteen: Vermont, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee.246  Second, in 1803 votes in Congress were no longer taken under 
the Articles of Confederation, which provided that each state got one vote, but 
rather were taken under the Constitution, which provides for counting the votes 
of individual members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.247  The 
third reason why the 1803 vote of Congress to admit Ohio was not sufficient to 
evidence such common consent to amend the articles of compact is especially 
compelling.  It turns out, Congress forgot to take the vote to approve the Ohio 
constitution in 1803 and did not correct its mistake until 1953.248   
 
243. Id. (Catron, J., concurring).  Justice Catron’s change of heart was apparently explained by 
his desire to avoid declaring that the fourth article of compact in the Northwest Ordinance was 
ineffective.  That article dealt with, among other things, the navigable waters of the Mississippi and St. 
Lawrence rivers, and Justice Catron, a slaveholder from Tennessee, was loathe to give up its 
protections: 
For thirty years, the State courts within the territory ceded by Virginia have held 
this part of the fourth article to be in force, and binding on them respectively; and 
I feel unwilling to disturb this wholesome course of decision, which is so 
conservative to the rights of others, in a case where the fourth article is in no wise 
involved, and when our opinion might be disregarded by the State courts as 
obiter, and a dictum uncalled for.  When the question arises here on the fourth 
article, it is desired by me, that no such embarrassment should be imposed on this 
court as necessarily must be by now passing judgment on the force of the fourth 
article, and pronouncing that it stand superseded and annulled. 
Id. at 99. (Catron, J., concurring). 
244. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
245. Id. 
246. Vermont was admitted in 1791, Kentucky in 1792, and Tennessee in 1796. Statehood 
Status, supra note 11. 
247. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
248. The Admission of Ohio as a State, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES 
(Aug. 7, 1953), http://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1951-2000/The-admission-of-Ohio-as-
a-state/ [https://perma.cc/AZ2M-JRVM].   
Representative George H. Bender of Ohio introduced the legislation . . . to 
retroactively grant statehood.  Calling the mistake a legislative oversight, Bender 
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In his Strader concurrence Justice McLean also refused to join Chief Justice 
Taney’s argument that the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance were 
rendered ineffective in toto with the adoption of the state constitutions.  He 
agreed with Justice Catron that as to the sixth article of compact, on slavery, 
the adoption of the Ohio constitution constituted an amendment of the 
Northwest Ordinance which rendered the sixth article of compact ineffective: 
The provision of the ordinance in regard to slavery was 
incorporated into the constitution of Ohio, which received the 
sanction of Congress when the State was admitted into the 
Union.  The constitution of the State, having thus received the 
consent of the original parties to the compact, must be 
considered, in regard to the prohibition of slavery, as 
substituted for the Ordinance, and consequently all questions 
of freedom must arise under the constitution, and not under the 
Ordinance.249 
But Justice McLean too was unwilling to go as far as Chief Justice Taney 
in declaring the articles of compact ineffective in toto: 
This, in my judgment, decides the question of jurisdiction, 
which is the only question before us.  And any thing that is said 
in the opinion of the court, in relation to the Ordinance, beyond 
this, is not in the case, and is, consequently, extrajudicial.250 
Both because Chief Justice Taney’s first argument is at odds with the 
language of the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact, and because it 
overplayed Permoli, it is unconvincing. 
B. The Northwest Ordinance Articles of Covenant Were Inconsistent with the 
Admission of New States on an Equal Footing 
Chief Justice Taney’s second argument was that the articles of compact of 
the Northwest Ordinance could not have been effective after the admission of 
the states created from the Northwest Territory because to do so would deny 
them admission on an equal footing with the original states.251  
The equal footing argument proceeded from the assertion that if the articles 
of compact “could be regarded as yet in operation in the states formed within 
 
stated, “The State constitutional convention presented the Constitution of Ohio to 
Congress on February 19, 1803, and Congress chose to ignore the whole 
business.”  Without congressional approval of the state constitution, Ohio 
technically remained part of the Northwest Territory. . . .  On May 19, 1953, the 
House voted to approve legislation retroactively ratifying the state constitution 
and admitting Ohio to the Union as of March 1, 1803. 
249. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 97 (1851) (McLean, J., concurring). 
250. Id. (McLean, J., concurring). 
251. Id. at 95–96. 
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the limits of the Northwestern Territory, it would place them in an inferior 
condition as compared with the other States, and subject their domestic 
institutions and municipal regulations to the constant supervision and control 
of this court.”252  This, Chief Justice Taney asserted in describing the process 
of admission to the Union, could not be allowed: 
[W]hen the Constitution was adopted, the settlement of that 
vast territory was hardly begun; and the people who filled it, 
and formed the great and populous States that now cover it, 
became inhabitants of the territory after the Constitution was 
adopted; and migrated upon the faith that its protection and 
benefits would be extended to them, and that they would in due 
time, according to its provisions and spirit, be admitted into the 
Union upon an equal footing with the old States.253 
The equal footing analysis first appeared in Pollard, where Justice 
McKinley used the phrase twice.254  He noted that when a territory reached a 
population of sixty thousand “such state shall be admitted by its delegates into 
the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original states 
in all respects whatever.”255  And he asserted that “[t]o maintain any other 
doctrine [other than that Alabama was entitled to the same sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over territory within its limits as Georgia had possessed] is to deny 
that Alabama has been admitted into the union on an equal footing with the 
original states, the constitution, laws, and compact, to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”256   
Chief Justice Taney was a bit coy about the provenance of the equal footing 
requirement.  He spoke of settlers in the territories who “migrated upon the faith 
that [the Constitution’s] protection and benefits would be extended to them, and 
that they would in due time, according to its provisions and spirit, be admitted 
into the Union upon an equal footing with the old States.”257  But neither the 
Articles of Confederation nor the Constitution contained a requirement that new 
states be admitted “on an equal footing” with the original states.  The Articles 
of Confederation simply provided for a vote of nine states to admit a new 
 
252. Id.  
253. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
254. The “equal footing” language appears once in Permoli, but only when Justice Catron quotes 
from the 1812 enabling statute. Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589, 609 (1845). 
255. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 (1845). 
256. Id. at 229. 
257. Strader, 51 U.S. at 96. 
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state.258  The Constitution only provides that “[n]ew States may be admitted by 
the Congress into this Union.”259   
The origin of the equal footing formulation can be identified from the 
statutes of admission of the first four states.  In 1791, the statutes of admission 
for the first two states, Vermont260 and Kentucky,261 did not use the equal 
footing formulation.  Instead, they characterized the new state “as a new and 
entire member of the United States of America.”262  That changed with the 
admissions of Tennessee in 1796263 and Ohio in 1802;264 their admissions 
statutes used the “equal footing” formulation.265  What was the origin of the 
new formulation?  Both Ohio and Tennessee were governed by the Northwest 
Ordinance; Vermont and Kentucky were not.266  And the Northwest Ordinance 
included the “equal footing formulation”: 
Sec. 13. And for extending the fundamental principles of civil 
and religious liberty, which form the basis whereon these 
republics, their laws and constitutions, are erected; to fix and 
establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, 
and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in 
the said territory: to provide, also, for the establishment of 
States, and permanent government therein, and for their 
admission to a share in the Federal councils on an equal footing 
with the original States, at as early periods as may be consistent 
with the general interest: 
Sec. 14. It is hereby ordained and declared, by the authority 
aforesaid, that the following articles shall be considered as 
 
258. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778, art. XI (“Canada acceding to this 
confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to 
all the advantages of this Union: but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such 
admission be agreed to by nine States.”). 
259. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
260. Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 191 (admitting the State of Vermont into the Union). 
261. Act of Feb. 4, 1791, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189 (admitting the State of Kentucky into the Union).  
262. Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 191 (“[A]s a new and entire member of the United States 
of America.”); Act of Feb. 4, 1791, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189 (“[A]s a new and entire member of the United 
States of America.”). 
263. Act of June 1, 1796, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 491 (admitting the State of Tennessee into the Union). 
264. Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173 (admitting Ohio into the Union).  
265. Act of June 1, 1796, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 491 (“[O]n an equal footing with the original states, in 
all respects whatever . . . .”); Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173 (“[U]pon the same footing with 
the original states, in all respects whatever.”). 
266. Ohio was directly governed by the Northwest Ordinance. See Northwest Ordinance, supra 
note 2, § 14, art. V.  Tennessee was created pursuant to the Southwest Ordinance, which incorporated 
the terms of the Northwest Ordinance. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 123, 123 (establishing 
the Southwest Territory).  
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articles of compact, between the original States and the people 
and States in the said territory, and forever remain unalterable, 
unless by common consent . . . .267 
The “equal footing” formulation was appropriated from the Northwest 
Ordinance and became the standard construction in the statutes admitting new 
states.  The formulation was used in every one of the sixteen statutes enacted 
between 1796 and 1851, when Chief Justice Taney wrote Strader.  It was used 
for both states that were governed by the Northwest Ordinance and those that 
were not, including, following Tennessee and Ohio, Louisiana in 1812,268 
Indiana in 1816,269 Mississippi in 1817,270 Illinois in 1818,271 Alabama in 
1819,272 Maine in 1820,273 Missouri in 1821,274 Arkansas in 1836,275 Michigan 
 
267. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 13, 14.  The equal footing language also appears in 
the fifth article of compact: “[S]uch State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the 
United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever; and shall be at 
liberty to form a permanent constitution and State government.” Id. at § 14, art. V. 
268. Act of Apr. 8, 1812, ch. 50, 2 Stat. 701 (admitting Louisiana into the Union) (“[I]s hereby 
declared to be one of the United States of America, and admitted into the Union on an equal footing 
with the original states, in all respects whatever . . . .”). 
269. Act of Apr. 19, 1816, ch. 57, 3 Stat. 289 (admitting Indiana into the Union) (“[T]he said 
state, when formed, shall be admitted into the union upon the same footing with the original states, in 
all respects whatever.”). 
270. Act of Mar. 1, 1817, ch. 23, 3 Stat. 348 (admitting Indiana into the Union) (“[T]he said 
state, when formed, shall be admitted into the union upon the same footing with the original states, in 
all respects whatever.”). 
271. Act of Apr. 18, 1818, ch. 67, 3 Stat. 428 (admitting Illinois into the Union) (“[T]he said 
state, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union upon the same footing with the original states, in 
all respects whatever.”). 
272. Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 47, 3 Stat. 489 (admitting Alabama into the Union) (“[T]he said 
territory, when formed into a state, shall be admitted into the union, upon the same footing with the 
original states, in all respects whatever.”). 
273. Act of Mar. 3, 1820, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 544 (admitting Maine into the Union) (“[I]s hereby 
declared to be one of the United States of America, and admitted into the Union on an equal footing 
with the original states, in all respects whatever.”). 
274. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545 (admitting Missouri into the Union) (“[T]he said 
state, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union, upon an equal footing with the original states, in 
all respects whatsoever.”). 
275. Act of June 15, 1836, ch. 100, 5 Stat. 50 (admitting Arkansas into the Union) (“[S]hall be 
one, and is hereby declared to be one of the United States of America, and admitted into the Union on 
an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever . . . .”). 
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in 1837,276 Florida in 1845,277 Texas in 1845,278 Iowa in 1846,279 Wisconsin in 
1848,280 and California in 1850.281 
Chief Justice Taney’s appropriation and use of the equal footing 
formulation from the Northwest Ordinance is subject to two objections, one 
narrow and the other broad. 
The narrow objection to Chief Justice Taney’s use of the equal footing 
formulation is that he misread the language of the text.  Section 13 did not 
guarantee “admission to the Union on an equal footing with the original 
States,”282 in the sense that the newly formed states could not be required to 
have substantively different constitutions and laws.283  Rather than such a 
notion of substantive uniformity, the “equal footing” language of Northwest 
Ordinance Section 13 guarantees the new states procedural equality: 
“[A]dmission to a share in the Federal councils on an equal footing with the 
original States.”284  Thus, one plausible interpretation of the equal footing 
language is that the newly formed states not be admitted into the Union in an 
inferior posture vis a vis the original states, for example having inferior voting 
rights in Congress.285  Under this reading, the equal footing language simply 
 
276. Act of June 15, 1836, ch. 99, 5 Stat. 49 (admitting Michigan into the Union) (“[S]hall be, 
and is hereby, declared to be one of the United States of America, and is hereby admitted into the 
Union upon an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatsoever . . . .”). 
277. Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 48, 5 Stat. 742 (admitting the State of Florida into the Union) 
(“That the States of Iowa and Florida be, and the same are hereby, declared to be States of the United 
States of America, and are hereby admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, 
in all respects whatever.”). 
278. Act of Dec. 29, 1845, res. 1, 9 Stat. 108 (admitting Texas into the Union) (“That the State 
of Texas shall be one, and is hereby declared to be one, of the United States of America, and admitted 
into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever.”). 
279. Act of Dec. 28, 1846, ch. 1, 9 Stat. 117 (admitting Iowa into the Union) (“That the State of 
Iowa shall be one, and is hereby declared to be one, of the United States of America, and admitted into 
the Union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.”). 
280. Act of May 29, 1848, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 233 (admitting Wisconsin into the Union) (“That the 
State of Wisconsin be, and is hereby, admitted to be one of the United States of America, and is hereby 
admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever . . . .”). 
281. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 452 (admitting California into the Union) (“That the 
State of California shall be one, and is hereby declared to be one, of the United States of America, and 
is admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever.”). 
282. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 13. 
283. Id. 
284. Id.  The “equal footing” language of the fifth article of compact is no more supportive of 
Chief Justice Taney’s interpretation: “[S]uch State shall be admitted . . . into the Congress of the 
United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever.” Id. § 14, art. V. 
285. When the Northwest Ordinance was enacted, voting in the Confederation Congress was by 
state, with each state having one vote.  Had Congress wanted to admit the new states in on inferior 
footing to the original thirteen states, it might have, for example, allocated each of the original thirteen 
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required that newly created states have equal representation in Congress with 
the original states. 
The history of the language that evolved to the “equal footing” formulation 
supports such a procedural reading.  A resolution of the Confederation 
Congress on October 10, 1780 provided that the states to be formed out of the 
Northwest Territory would “have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and 
independence, as the other states.”286  According to one commentator, this 
resolution “promised the settlers admission into the Union on terms of equality 
with the original States.”287  A noted historian identified this as one of “the two 
essential ideas of the American colonial system,” which he framed as “the 
ultimate admission of the colony into the Union on terms of equality with the 
older members.”288 
In 1782, Theodorick Bland of Virginia made a motion in the Confederation 
Congress in which he phrased it that each state admitted out of the Northwestern 
Territory would “become and ever after be and constitute a separate and 
independant (sic) free & sovereign state and be admitted into the Union as such 
with all the privileges and immunities of those states which now compose the 
Union.”289  The Confederation Congress adopted a resolution on October 15, 
1783, which said the states to be created out of the Northwest Territory would 
each be “a free, sovereign and independent state, to be admitted to a 
representation in the union.”290 
The “equal footing” formulation first appeared in the Ordinance of 1784, 
which provided that the states admitted out of the Northwest Territory would 
be “admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal 
footing with the said original states.”291  The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was 
taken for a third reading on July 9, 1787.292  It provided that upon the states to 
be admitted from the Northwest Territory reaching the required population, 
 
states two votes and the newly admitted states one vote, or required a majority of both the total number 
of states and the original thirteen for a measure to pass, or provided for only the original thirteen states 
to vote on matters of great importance.  Any of these structures would have admitted new states on an 
unequal footing. 
286. Merriam, supra note 47, at 304 (citing 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 
1774–1789, at 915 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)). 
287. Id. at 304.  
288. MCLAUGHLIN, CONFEDERATION, supra note 4, at 115.  McLaughlin cast the other essential 
idea as “temporary government with a large measure of self-government for the colony.” Id. 
289. Merriam, supra note 47, at 306. 
290. Id. at 308 (citing 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 694 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922)).  
291. Ordinance of 1784, supra note 126; Merriam, supra note 47, at 309. 
292. Merriam, supra note 47, at 320.  
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“such state shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United 
States, on an equal footing with the said original states.”293 
The earlier formulations, “have the same rights . . . as the other states,”294 
“admission . . . on terms of equality with the original States,”295 
“admitted . . . with all the privileges and immunities of those states which now 
compose the Union,”296 “admitted to a representation in the union,”297 and 
“admitted . . . on an equal footing with the said original states”298 all seem 
consistent with the procedural reading and not supportive of Chief Justice 
Taney’s substantive uniformity reading.  
The broader objection to Chief Justice Taney’s use of the equal footing 
formulation is that he misrepresented the relation of the equal footing guarantee 
with the articles of compact.  He used a misreading of the equal footing 
formulation to assert a hostility between the equal footing guarantee and the 
articles of compact.  But in fact, the equal footing guarantee is included in the 
introductory language for the articles of compact, evidencing a congressional 
belief that the two are compatible.  Although in most modern presentations the 
original text of the Northwest Ordinance is divided into separately numbered 
sections, in the original document they were not.  In the original, only the six 
articles of compact were separately numbered.  Thus, what we refer to as 
Sections 13 and 14 were, in the original, one long sentence presented in two 
paragraphs.  Thus, Congress articulated the equal footing formulation in the 
same sentence of the Northwest Ordinance in which it provided for the 
perpetual articles of compact.  For Chief Justice Taney to later claim the articles 
of compact are precluded by the equal footing formulation is rather 
intellectually dishonest. 
Because of the origin of the equal footing concept in the same Northwest 
Ordinance text as the articles of compact, Chief Justice Taney’s argument that 






293. Ordinance of 1784, supra note 126. 
294. Merriam, supra note 47, at 304 (citing 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 
1774–1789, at 915 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)). 
295. Id. at 304. 
296. Id. at 306. 
297. Id. at 308 (citing 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 694 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922)). 
298. Ordinance of 1784, supra note 126; Merriam, supra note 47, at 309. 
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C. The Ordinance Articles of Compact Ceased to Be Effective Upon 
Ratification of the Constitution 
Chief Justice Taney’s final argument was that the ratification of the 
Constitution itself rendered the Northwest Ordinance of no further effect.299  He 
started from the proposition that “many of the provisions” of the Northwest 
Ordinance articles of compact and the Constitution were “inconsistent”: 
Indeed, it is impossible to look at the six articles, which are 
supposed, in the argument, to be still in force, without seeing 
at once that many of the provisions contained in them are 
inconsistent with the present Constitution.300 
But, he seemed to argue, the allegedly inconsistent articles of compact were 
amended by ratification of the Constitution.  Here, he invoked the language of 
Section 14 of the Northwest Ordinance on modifications of the articles of 
compact:301  
The Constitution was, in the language of the Ordinance, 
“adopted by common consent,” and the people of the 
Territories must necessarily be regarded as parties to it, and 
bound by it, and entitled to its benefits, as well as the people of 
the then existing States.302 
There are two quite substantial problems with this argument.  The first is 
that ratification of the Constitution could not have constituted an amendment 
of the Northwest Ordinance, by its terms.  Section 14 of the Northwest 
Ordinance provided that the articles of compact would “forever remain 
unalterable, unless by common consent.”303  Chief Justice Taney conflated 
several things in his “common consent” statement.  Several are true, but 
irrelevant to the question of whether ratification of the Constitution constituted 
an amendment of the articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance.  The one 
relevant assertion is not true.  
It is undoubtedly true that, as citizens of the United States, residents of the 
Northwest Territory were both bound by the Constitution and beneficiaries of 
it; but those observations are irrelevant to the question of whether ratification 
of the Constitution constituted an amendment of the Northwest Ordinance 
articles of compact “by common consent.”  
 
299. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 95 (1851). 
300. Id. 
301. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14 (“[T]hat the following articles shall be considered 
as articles of compact, between the original States and the people and States in the said territory, and 
forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
302. Strader, 51 U.S. at 96. 
303. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
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Chief Justice Taney’s assertion that “the people of the Territories must 
necessarily be regarded as parties to [the Constitution]”304 was imprecise.  They 
were parties to the Constitution in the sense that they were citizens and thus 
beneficiaries of it.  But the question of whether ratification of the Constitution 
constituted an amendment of the Northwest Ordinance depends on whether 
ratification of the Constitution was by “common consent” of “the original States 
and the people and States in the said territory.”305  And the citizens living in the 
Northwest Territory simply were not parties to the ratification of the 
Constitution, and that is the fallacy of Taney’s argument. 
It is true, as Chief Justice Taney asserted, that “[t]he Constitution was, in 
the language of the Ordinance, ‘adopted by common consent.’”306  The problem 
is, the Constitution was ratified by the common consent of a group that excluded 
“the people and States in the said territory” as required in the Northwest 
Ordinance to modify that document.307  The Constitution was ratified by the 
votes of the existing states.308  There was no mechanism for the participation of 
the people of the territories.  That being the case, there was no “common 
consent” between “the original States and the people and States in the said 
territory” in the ratification of the Constitution, and it cannot stand as a 
modification of the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact. 
The second substantial problem with Chief Justice Taney’s modification 
argument is that it is quite clear that Congress did not think the Northwest 
Ordinance was substantively incompatible with the Constitution.  After 
ratification of the Constitution, Congress acted “so as to adapt the same to the 
present Constitution of the United States.”309  But in doing so it made only very 
minor technical amendments to the Northwest Ordinance, thus indicating that 
 
304. Strader, 51 U.S. at 96. 
305. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
306. Strader, 51 U.S. at 96. 
307. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14. 
308. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient 
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the states so ratifying the same.”).  There are several 
problems with using the ratification of the Constitution to constitute the “common consent” of the 
thirteen original states to modification of the Northwest Ordinance articles of compact.  First, 
ratification, at least as to the ratifying states, required only nine of the thirteen states. Id. (“The 
ratification of the Conventions of nine states, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this 
Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.”).  Second, Rhode Island rejected ratification of 
the Constitution repeatedly, and only voted to ratify only after the Senate passed an economic embargo 
of Rhode Island and sent the measure to the House of Representatives.  Acting under duress, within 
days of the Senate action Rhode Island ratified the Constitution but even then did so with multiple 
caveats on its approval. Rhode Island’s Ratification, U.S. CONST., 
https://www.usconstitution.net/rat_ri.html [https://perma.cc/W3WK-WSBU] (last modified Jan. 8, 
2010).  
309. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 (1789). 
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more substantive revisions were not required to comport with the 
Constitution.310   
Because of the language of the Northwest Ordinance and the actions of 
Congress, Chief Justice Taney’s third argument, that the ratification of the 
Constitution modified the terms of the Northwest Ordinance to conform to the 
provisions of the Constitution, is unconvincing.  
On the basis of these arguments, Chief Justice Taney concluded that the 
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in the matter and dismissed the writ of error 
filed by Strader, Gorman, and Armstrong.311  After almost a decade, the 
litigation arising from the escape of Henry, Reuben, and James to freedom was 
over.312 
V. THE LEGAL AFTERMATH OF STRADER 
Chief Justice Taney’s Strader opinion enjoyed only modest success, if one 
measures success on the basis of being cited in subsequent cases.  The 
proposition that states have the right to determine the status and social condition 
of persons who are domiciled in the state was cited six times in slavery cases.313  
The same proposition proved even more successful in divorce and child custody 
cases, with eleven citations,314 and in guardianship cases, with two citations.315  
Strader was cited three times for procedural propositions,316 and once as to the 
 
310. See supra text accompanying notes 63–67. 
311. Strader, 51 U.S. at 97. 
312. Actually, not quite.  In 1855, Dr. Graham’s attorney filed a motion in the Supreme Court to 
amend the 1851 judgment to award his client costs. Strader v. Graham, 59 U.S. 602, 602 (1855).  His 
motion was overruled because the early appeal having been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, no 
award of costs could be made. Id. 
313. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 452 (1857); id. at 462–63 (Nelson, J., concurring); In re 
Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 166 (1858); Liza v. Puissant, 7 La. Ann. 80, 81, 83 (1852); Lemmon v. People, 20 
N.Y 562, 621, 624 (1860); Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622, 647 (1856); Willis v. Jolliffe, 32 
S.C. Eq. (2 Rich. Eq.) 447, 460 (1860).   
314. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 611 (1906); Cohen v. Cohen, 84 A. 122, 123 (Del. 
1912); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill. App. 475, 497 (1895); Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156, 160–61 
(1877); Payton v. Payton, 225 P. 576, 576 (N.M. 1924); Leith v. Leith, 39 N.H. 20, 33 (1859); Hunt v. 
Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 227–28 (1878); People ex rel. Campbell v. Dewey, 50 N.Y.S. 1013, 1016 (1898); 
Van Fossen v. State, 37 Ohio St. 317, 319–20 (1881); Solomon v. Solomon, 1 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 113, 
116 (1903); Turpin v. Turpin, 58 S.W. 763, 771 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).   
315. Woodward v. Woodward, 11 S.W. 892, 893 (Tenn. 1889); Redmon v. Leach, 130 S.W.2d 
873, 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). 
316. The original opinion in Strader was noted in the 1855 order denying costs, Strader, 59 U.S. 
at 602, and in two unrelated cases on procedural propositions, East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 
51 U.S. 511, 539 (1851) (permissible grounds for revising lower court judgments) and Abbey v. 
Stevens, 1 F. Cas. 10, 12 (D. N.Y. 1861) (No. 8) (no costs if dismissal for want of jurisdiction).   
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inherent police power of the states.317  These Strader references did not speak 
directly to the continuing effectiveness of the Northwest Ordinance. 
Twenty-five cases used Strader as to the continuing effectiveness of the 
Northwest Ordinance.  Of course, Chief Justice Taney’s most notable decision, 
Scott v. Sandford, cited Strader for the proposition that the Northwest 
Ordinance was no longer effective.318  Nine other cases generally followed 
Strader in holding the Northwest Ordinance no longer in force.319  The 
equal footing analysis was used in nine cases which found the Northwest 
 
317. State v. Brown, 86 S.E. 1042, 1043 (N.C. 1915) (“The police power is inherent in the 
original sovereignty of the state, and the fourteenth amendment in no wise curtails it.”).  The court 
must be citing Strader for the first part of the proposition since, of course, the case predated the 14th 
Amendment.   
318. Scott, 60 U.S. at 453 (Taney, C.J., majority); id. at 463–64 (Nelson, J., concurring); id. at 
491 (Daniel, J., concurring). 
319. See Woodman v. Kilbourn Mfg. Co., 30 F. Cas. 503, 505 (D. Wis. 1867) (No. 17,978) (“By 
the act of congress admitting the new state upon its application, the several articles of the compact 
were not merely altered by the common consent required in the ordinance, but were superseded.”); see 
also Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 159 (1886) (“The Articles of Confederation ceased to 
exist upon the adoption of the Federal Constitution; and the Ordinance of 1787, like all acts of Congress 
for the government of the Territories, had no force in any State after its admission into the Union under 
that Constitution.”); Territory ex rel. Smith v. Scott, 20 N.W. 401, 406 (Dak. 1884) (“The ordinance 
of 1787 for the government of the Northwestern territory has been already alluded to, and although 
that was enacted prior to the adoption of the constitution and is not now in force . . . .”); People ex rel. 
Woodyatt v. Thompson, 40 N.E. 307, 313 (Ill. 1895) (“The [S]upreme [C]ourt of the United States has 
in numerous cases decided that the ordinance of 1787 has become inoperative.”); People ex rel. McCrea 
v. United States, 93 Ill. 30, 35 (1879) (“It may be added, as a matter of course, if the ordinance is not 
in force in Ohio, it can not be in force in Illinois.”); Coyle v. Smith, 113 P. 944, 951, 961 (Okla. 1911); 
Am. Barge Line Co. v. Koontz, 68 S.E.2d 56, 61 (W. Va. 1951) (“The next question relates to the 
applicability of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  It has been repeatedly stated that after the admission 
of a state into the Union such ordinance is no longer of any force.”); State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. 
Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 738 (1892) (“[W]hen the ordinance of 1787 and the organic act as well, 
which were adapted only to the territorial condition of Wisconsin, became obsolete and ceased to have 
any operative force, except as voluntarily adopted by her after she became a state of the Union . . . .”); 
State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. 8, 44 N.W. 967, 977 (1890) (“[T]hat by the adoption 
of our state constitution, and the admission of the state into the Union, that article became superseded 
and ceased to be longer in force.”). 
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Ordinance to no longer be in force.320  Two courts avoided the issue.321  One 
court noted the conflict over the continuing effectiveness of the Northwest 
ordinance.322 
Notably, three cases presented challenges to Chief Justice Taney’s Strader 
analysis.  The first case to challenge Taney’s analysis, decided only two years 
after Strader, was Columbus Insurance Co. v. Curtenius.323  Curtenius was an 
Illinois case involving a collision between a canal boat and a bridge.  
 
320. See Flambeau River Lumber Co. v. Gettle, 236 N.W. 671, 676 (1931); see also Coyle v. 
Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911) (“The plain deduction from this case is that when a new State is 
admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which 
pertain to the original States, and that such powers may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired 
or shorn away by any conditions, compacts or stipulations embraced in the act under which the new 
State came into the Union, which would not be valid and effectual if the subject of congressional 
legislation after admission.”); Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 546 (1886); Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 
107 U.S. 678, 689 (1883); Williams v. Hert, 110 F. 166, 170 (D. Ind. 1901) (“The ordinance of 1787 
and the other acts above quoted have ceased to operate as limitations on the powers of the state.  This 
state possesses all the sovereign powers possessed by any one of the original states of the Union, in all 
respects whatever.”); Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 (D. Or. 1889) (“The doctrine that new states must 
be admitted into the Union on an ‘equal footing’ with the old ones does not rest on any express 
provision of the constitution, which simply declares (article 4, § 3) ‘new states may be admitted by 
congress into this Union,’ but on what is considered and has been held by the supreme court to be the 
general character and purpose of the union of the states, as established by the constitution,—a union 
of political equals.”); Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 19 F. 347, 352–53 (D. Or. 1884) (“Although 
the grant of power to congress to admit new states into this Union (U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3) is 
unqualified, yet it is well established by the supreme court that congress cannot admit a state upon any 
other than an equal footing with the other states therein, and therefore cannot, as a consideration of 
such admission, make any valid compact or enactment which shall deny to such state within its limits 
the municipal powers common to the others.”); State ex rel. Donahey v. Edmondson, 105 N.E. 269, 
274 (Ohio 1913) (“Congress has no power to admit a state to the Union under restrictions which render 
it unequal to other states, or to deprive a state, when admitted, of any attribute of power essential to its 
equality with the other states.”); Coyle, 113 P. at 953–54, 956–57. 
321. See Huse v. Glover, 15 F. 292, 297 (D. Ill. 1883) (“Nor do we perceive that the power of 
the state in this respect is in any degree affected by the ordinance of 1787, even if that ordinance, as to 
the matters now under consideration, be not superseded by the constitution of the United States.”); Ex 
parte Holman, 28 Iowa 88, 127 (1869) (habeas corpus guaranteed, unnecessary to say whether through 
Northwest Ordinance).  
322. Guthrie v. McConnel, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 157, 160 (C.P. 1859) (“The ordinance of 1787 
provides that this river shall be a public highway, forever free, etc.  If this provision is in force, it 
restrains State legislation, and affords another reason why the license from the State to the defendant 
shall not be construed to authorize him seriously to obstruct navigation.  It is said however, that by the 
subsequent adoption of the Constitution of the United States, and the admission of Ohio as a State, into 
the Union, this provision of the Ordinance has been abrogated; that the several States come into the 
Confederacy upon equal terms; that if this provision is still in force, it serves to restrict the legislation 
of the State, or is a guarantee from the Federal Government not imposed or given to States not formed 
from the North-West Territory.  Upon that question, the authorities are in conflict.”).  
323. Columbus Ins. Co. v. Curtenius, 6 F. Cas. 186 (D. Ill. 1853) (No. 3,045). 
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Defendants constructed a bridge across the Illinois River near Peoria.324  On 
March 19, 1849, plaintiff’s insured’s canal boat, which was then under tow, 
struck defendants’ bridge and sank, taking with it a load of wheat.325  The 
district court first discussed whether the Illinois River was a navigable river 
free to all citizens, finding that under the common law, it was not: 
The first point to be determined is, whether the river Illinois, 
over which this bridge has been erected, is in law a navigable 
river free to all citizens.  The tide does not ebb and flow there, 
and technically, according to the common law, it is not 
navigable, though it is so in fact.326 
But, the court observed, the Northwest Ordinance provided a different 
result: 
By the ordinance for the government of the territory northwest 
of the river Ohio, of 1787, it was provided (article 4) that the 
navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence 
should be common highways, and forever free to all the 
citizens of the United States.327 
Citing Strader, Permoli, and Pollard, the district court allowed: “It is said 
that this provision of the ordinance is not in force.”328  But, the district court, 
observed: “This seems to be the doctrine now established by the supreme court 
of the United States, contrary to what has been the general understanding for 
many years, in the states carved out of that territory.”329  The Curtenius district 
court then raised some fundamental questions about the analysis in Strader.  
The district court acknowledged the “common consent” mechanism by which 
the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance might be amended.330  It then 
challenged the Strader analysis by noting that “it seems certain that congress 
did not exactly regard the ordinance as at an end, by the adoption of the 
constitution of the United States.”331  To support its analysis, the district court 
cited four things.  First, that Congress enacted a post-ratification statute which 
made technical amendments to conform the Northwest Ordinance to the 
 
324. Id. at 187. 
325. Id. at 186–87. 
326. Id. at 187. 
327. Id.  
328. Id.  
329. Id.  
330. Id.:  
It was never doubted but that any provisions of the ordinance which were contrary 
to the constitution of the United States, and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, 
or to the constitutions of the states formed out of that territory were abrogated, 
because the “common consent” mentioned in the ordinance was then presumed. 
331. Id.  
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Constitution. 332  Second, that Congress admitted states out of the Northwest 
Territory with the proviso that they act in conformity with the Northwest 
Ordinance.333  Third, that Congress “extended the provisions of this ordinance, 
except the introductory clause, over some of the southwestern states.”334  
Fourth, that Congress acted, after ratification of the Constitution, consistently 
in accord with the navigable waters provisions of the Northwest Ordinance.  
“Indeed,” the district court concluded, “it may be safely affirmed that in no 
instance has congress permitted an occasion to pass without declaring that the 
Mississippi and its navigable tributaries shall remain public highways and 
forever free.”335 
In the end, the Curtenius district court avoided a direct challenge to the 
suggestion that the Northwest Ordinance was rendered ineffective by 
ratification of the Constitution: 
Now, it is immaterial whether congress has legislated under the 
impression that a part of the ordinance of 1787 was still in 
force, although it is not; provided it is apparent from its whole 
tenor of legislation that it has re-enacted such part and given it 
continued operation.  And that does seem to be the fact in this 
instance.336 
Finally, the district court argued, even if the Northwest Ordinance was not 
in effect by its own force, it was in force by virtue of the extensions of the 
Ordinance subsequent to ratification of the Constitution.337 
The second case which presented a challenge to Chief Justice Taney’s 
Strader analysis came in 1901, in the Supreme Court case of Downes v. 
 
332. Id. (“[A]s is plain from the very first law on the subject adapting it to the constitution.”) 
(citing Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (reenacting the Northwest Ordinance)). 
333. Id. at 187–88 (“And in allowing the various states which were formed out of that territory 
to adopt state governments, provision was made that they should not do anything repugnant to the 
ordinance, with certain specified exceptions.”). 
334. Id. at 188. 
335. Id.  
336. Id.  
337. Id. at 190: 
There is great reason for saying, therefore, independently of the various statutes 
which have been referred to, that if the ordinance of 1787 is not in force in Illinois 
proprio vigore this part of it which we are now speaking of, is in force by virtue 
of the compact which may be said to have been made since the adoption of the 
constitution, between the United States and the states formed out of the northwest 
territory, and that the compact is binding on the states of the northwest territory, 
for the same reason that it is binding on Alabama, Mississippi or Louisiana. 
Id. 
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Bidwell.338  The issues in Downes were whether the imposition of duties under 
the Foraker Act on goods received from Puerto Rico was unconstitutional by 
virtue of Article I, Sections 8 and 9,339 and “the broader question whether the 
revenue clauses of the Constitution extend of their own force to our newly 
acquired territories.”340  The underlying issue was the nature of territories 
within the national structure.341  Justice Brown, writing for the Court, did not 
address Chief Justice Taney’s Strader position.342  Chief Justice Taney’s 
Strader analysis was questioned in Justice White’s concurrence, in which 
Justices Shiras and McKenna joined.343  Justice White noted both Chief Justice 
Taney’s Strader analysis and the contrary analysis.344  His conclusion was that 
the portion of the Northwest Ordinance relevant to the question presented in 
Downes remained effective: 
Whatever view may be taken of this difference of legal 
opinion, my mind refuses to assent to the conclusion that under 
 
338. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).  Downes arose shortly following the seizure of Puerto Rico during the 
Spanish–American War and involved the issue of whether oranges imported from Puerto Rico to the 
Port of New York were subject to duties.  The Foraker Act, which instituted a governmental structure 
for Puerto Rico following annexation, required the collection of duties on products imported from 
Puerto Rico equal to “fifteen per centum of the duties which are required to be levied, collected and 
paid upon like articles of merchandise imported from foreign countries.” Id. at 247–48 (citation 
omitted). 
339. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States . . . .”), § 9 (“[N]or shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, 
or pay Duties in another.”). 
340. Downes, 182 U.S. at 249. 
341. Id.  
342. Id.  Justice Brown noted the creation of the Northwest Territory. Id. at 250.  He also noted, 
and rejected, Chief Justice Taney’s argument in Scott that the Federal government was not authorized 
to create territorial governments: 
It was thought by Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case . . . that the power 
“to make needful rules and regulations” was not intended to . . . authorize the 
establishment of territorial governments . . . .  But, as we observed in De Lima v. 
Bidell, the power to establish territorial governments has been too long exercised 
by Congress and acquiesced in by this court to be deemed an unsettled question. 
Id.  Justice Brown concluded that the Foraker Act was constitutional because “the Island of Puerto 
Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States 
within the revenue clauses of the Constitution.” Id. at 287. 
343. Id.  
344. Id. at 320 (White, J., concurring): 
The opinion has been expressed that the ordinance of 1787 became inoperative 
and a nullity on the adoption of the Constitution, while, on the other hand, it has 
been said that the ordinance of 1787 was “the most solemn of all engagements,” 
and became a part of the Constitution of the United States by reason of the sixth 
article. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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the Constitution the provision of the Northwest Territory 
ordinance making such territory forever a part of the 
confederation was not binding on the government of the United 
States when the Constitution was formed.345 
Justice White found support for the continued effectiveness of the 
Northwest Ordinance after ratification of the Constitution in the actions of the 
First Congress conforming the Northwest Ordinance in technical detail,346 and 
in the extension of the terms of the Northwest Ordinance to territories organized 
after ratification of the Constitution.347 
The third case which presented a challenge to Chief Justice Taney’s Strader 
analysis came in 1911, in the Ohio Supreme Court case of State v. Boone.348  
Boone addresses the question of the limits of the police power of the state.349  
The court’s analysis on point begins with a Connecticut case, State v. Wordin,350 
in which the Connecticut Supreme Court declared that the personal liberty 
guarantees of the Federal Constitution “place no limitation upon the power of 
the legislature of this state to require gratuitous service from one member of the 
community in the protection of the lives of all.”351  The Boone court declared: 
“[T]here is grave reason to doubt whether it is sound law in this jurisdiction, 
owing to specific provisions of the Ordinance of 1787.”352 
The court noted the construction of the Northwest Ordinance, 
differentiating between the first twelve sections and the articles of compact: 
“The first 12 sections of the ordinance obviously provided for the temporary 
government of the territory until it should be divided and organized into states.  
Then follows something of more enduring interest.”353  The Boone court then 
quoted the introductory language to the articles of compact: 
And for extending the fundamental principles of civil and 
 
345. Id. at 321. 
346. Id.: 
Beyond question, in one of the early laws enacted at the first session of the First 
Congress, the binding force of the ordinance was recognized, and certain of its 
provisions concerning the appointment of officers in the territory were amended 
to conform the ordinance to the new Constitution. 
Id. 
347. Id. at 321–22. 
348. 95 N.E. 924, 926–27 (Ohio 1911). 
349. Boone involved a challenge to an Ohio statute that required health care professionals to 
provide information for the registration of births and deaths.  The defendant was found guilty and 
challenged his conviction. Id. at 924. 
350. 14 A. 801 (Conn. 1887).  
351. Boone, 95 N.E. at 925 (quoting Wordin, 14 A. at 803). 
352. Id.  
353. Id.  
VESTAL, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2019  6:04 PM 
2019] THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE AND STRADER V. GRAHAM 1145 
religious liberty, which form the basis whereon these republics, 
their laws and constitutions, are erected; to fix and establish 
those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and 
governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in the 
said territory; to provide, also, for the establishment of states, 
and permanent government therein, and for their admission to 
a share in the federal councils on an equal footing with the 
original states, at as early periods as may be consistent with the 
general interest: It is hereby ordained and declared, by the 
authority aforesaid, that the following articles shall be 
considered as articles of compact, between the original states 
and the people and states in the said territory, and forever 
remain unalterable, unless by common consent . . . .354 
As to the assertion that adoption of the State of Ohio’s first constitution 
superseded the Northwest Ordinance, the Boone court cited the fifth article of 
compact guarantee that: “The constitution and government, so to be formed, 
shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these 
articles.”355  The court illustrated the application of the concept: 
If our constitution, instead of creating a republican form of 
government for the state, had provided a pure democracy, a 
government directly by the people, and, so framed, it had been 
accepted by the President and Congress of the United States, 
there might have been some reason for the claim that, in that 
respect, the compact which was to “remain forever unaltered, 
unless by common consent” had been repealed by implication; 
yet, even under such circumstances, a conclusive presumption 
would not be raised that the compact had been altered, without 
the common consent of all the parties thereto.356 
Having acknowledged the possibility of alteration by common consent, the 
Boone court raised the possibility that the original Ohio constitution would have 
simply omitted some provisions within the Northwest Ordinance: 
But if the convention which prepared our constitution had 
omitted from the Bill of Rights, the famous interdiction against 
slavery, contained in article 6 of the ordinance, would that have 
justified the conclusion that the compact was altered and that 
the existence of slavery in Ohio would be constitutional?357 
The Boone court answered this question in the negative: 
Or, to put the question in another form, if our constitution 
 
354. Id. at 925–26 (quoting Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 13, 14). 
355. Id. at 926 (quoting Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. V). 
356. Id.  
357. Id.  
VESTAL, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2019  6:04 PM 
1146 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:1087 
contained nothing whatever in regard to the privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus, or to trial by jury, or to proportional 
representation of the people in the Legislature, or to the 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, it could not be 
justly inferred that the great compact had been altered, and that 
these privileges and guaranties had been subtracted from the 
rights of the citizens, and were not included among the rights 
reserved by the people . . . because there would have been 
nothing in the constitution which was inconsistent with the 
Ordinance, and the declared purpose thereof “to fix and 
establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, 
and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in 
the said territory,” and that these “articles shall be considered 
as articles of compact between the original states and the 
people and states in the said territory, and forever remain 
unalterable, unless by common consent.”358 
The Boone court quoted with approval from two earlier Ohio cases, saying 
the “quotations remain as the unmodified expressions of this court upon this 
subject.”359  The first was Hogg v. Zanesville Canal & Manufacturing Co.,360 
in which the court spoke of the navigable waters clause in the fourth article of 
compact: 
This portion of the Ordinance of 1787, is as much obligatory 
upon the state of Ohio as our own constitution.  In truth it is 
more so; for the Constitution may be altered by the people of 
the state, while this cannot be altered without the assent both 
of the people of this state and of the United States through their 
representatives.  It is an article of compact, and, until we 
assume the principle that the sovereign power of the state is not 
bound by contract, this clause must be considered 
obligatory.361 
The Boone court also quoted from Hutchinson v. Thompson,362 another 
navigable waters case: 
But when application for admission into the Union was made 
by the people inhabiting the eastern part of the territory, 
modifications in several parts of the ordinance were asked for, 
and they were granted by the United States, as one party, to the 
state as the other.  This seems to show that the people of Ohio 
 
358. Id. (quoting Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 13, 14). 
359. Id.  
360. 5 Ohio 410 (1832).  
361. Boone, 95 N.E. at 926 (quoting Hogg, 5 Ohio at 416). 
362. 9 Ohio 52 (1839). 
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have so far treated the articles of compact as of perpetual 
obligation.  The alterations proposed were with a view to the 
immediate formation of a state Constitution, and were of no 
importance if the states should have a right to annul the 
Ordinance the moment it assumed that condition.363 
The Boone court concluded by noting, and rejecting, the analysis embodied 
in Chief Justice Taney’s Strader opinion: 
We are not unaware of various dicta which have appeared from 
time to time in opinions by learned Justices of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, beginning with Pollard’s 
Lessee v. Hagan, Permoli v. First Municipality, and 
Strader v. Graham.  But it requires no acute analysis to 
differentiate those cases and to show that they do not go very 
thoroughly into the question whether the Ordinance of 1787 
can be superseded otherwise than by the “common consent” of 
the parties to the compact, as required by the terms of the 
Ordinance, or whether such “common consent” ever has been 
given; and, giving the fullest effect that can be claimed from 
those remarks by the distinguished judges, it is obvious that 
they ignore the distinction between a mere act of Congress, 
which may be repealed or superseded by subsequent acts, and 
a solemn and formal “compact,” in the nature of a treaty as it 
were, between the proprietary states and the people and states 
of the territory which was subsequently to be erected into 
several states of this Union.  They ignore, moreover, the fact 
that the compact, on the good faith of which the original 
proprietors ceded this territory to the United States, expressly 
declared that the principles declared therein shall be the basis 
of “all laws, constitutions and governments which forever 
hereafter shall be formed in the said territory;” and at best these 
declarations rest on no stronger foundation than the provision 
of the compact itself, namely, that a state with constitutional 
limitations as provided, “shall be admitted, by its delegates, 
into the Congress of the United States, on an equal 
footing with the original states, in all respects whatever.” . . . 
Whatever that clause may mean, it certainly does not mean that 
all state Constitutions shall be, or are, alike, nor that a new state 
erected in the Northwest Territory, shall be understood to 
surrender all the guaranties of the compact as a condition of 
admission as a state.364 
 
363. Boone, 95 N.E. at 926 (quoting Hutchinson, 9 Ohio at 62).  The court notes: “Similar 
language is found in the opinion in Cochran’s Heirs v. Loring, 17 Ohio 409, 424–25 [(1848)].” Id. 
364. Id. at 926–27 (internal citations omitted). 
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The conclusion was a clear departure from Strader: 
We have thus briefly indicated the reasons for our belief, that 
the Great Charter of the Northwest Territory is still under, and 
above, and before, all laws or Constitutions which have yet 
been made in the states which are parts of that territory; and 
that under its guaranties the state has not the right to draft a 
citizen into particular service without substantial 
compensation.365 
Chief Justice Taney’s equal footing argument was cited repeatedly through 
the next eighty years,366 although some courts evidenced skepticism at the full 
extent of Chief Justice Taney’s assertion,367 or rejected the equal footing 
argument completely.368  As one Federal judge cast the proposition in 1889: 
The doctrine that new states must be admitted into the Union 
on an “equal footing” with the old ones does not rest on any 
 
365. Id. at 927. 
366. The Dred Scott concurrence of Justice Daniel used the equal footing analysis: 
Again he says, “with respect to what has taken place in the Northwest territory, it 
may be observed that the ordinance giving it its distinctive character on the 
subject of slaveholding proceeded from the old Congress, acting with the best 
intentions, but under a charter which contains no shadow of the authority 
exercised; and it remains to be decided how far the States formed within that 
territory, and admitted into the Union, are on a different footing from its other 
members as to their legislative sovereignty . . . .” 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 491 (1857) (Daniel, J., concurring); see also Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 
543, 546 (1886) (citing Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82 (1851) and admission statute for language that 
state was “admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects 
whatever”).  
 Other Federal courts have used the equal footing language. See Huse v. Glover, 15 F. 292, 297 
(D. Ill. 1883), aff’d 119 U.S. 543 (1886) (noting that the Northwest Ordinance “itself provided for the 
admission of the new states ‘on an equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatever’”); 
see also Williams v. Hert, 110 F. 166, 170 (D. Ind. 1901) (“It was admitted into the Union on an equal 
footing with the original states in all respects whatever.  The ordinance of 1787 and the other acts 
above quoted have ceased to operate as limitations on the powers of the state.”) (internal quotation 
omitted); Columbus Ins. Co. v. Curtenius, 6 F. Cas. 186, 188 (D. Ill. 1853) (No. 3,045) (“But it is said, 
that the new states having come into the Union upon an equal footing with the original states . . . .”). 
 The equal footing construction has also been cited by state courts. State ex rel. Donahey v. 
Edmondson, 105 N.E. 269, 273 (Ohio 1913) (“This grant of power, of course, extended to the new 
states to be formed out of the Northwest Territory, and the original compact provided that these states 
should be admitted into the Union on equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever.”); 
Coyle v. Smith, 113 P. 944, 952–54 (Okla. 1911); Flambeau River Lumber Co. v. Gettle, 236 N.W. 
671, 675 (1931); State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 738 (1892).  
367. See Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 19 F. 347, 357–58 (D. Or. 1884). 
368. See Boone, 95 N.E. at 925–27 (rejecting equal footing argument that Northwest Ordinance 
was no longer in effect by declaring that “the Great Charter of the Northwest Territory is still under, 
and above, and before, all laws or Constitutions which have yet been made in the states which are parts 
of that territory”). 
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express provision of the constitution, which simply declares 
(article 4, § 3) “new states may be admitted by congress into 
this Union,” but on what is considered and has been held by 
the supreme court to be the general character and purpose of 
the union of the states, as established by the constitution,—a 
union of political equals.369 
Several courts that invoked the equal footing formulation cited the statutes 
under which the states were admitted to the Union.370  Several courts that 
invoked the equal footing formulation cited the Northwest Ordinance.371  
Chief Justice Taney’s Strader opinion was last cited by an American court 
in a 1951 West Virginia tax case.372 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In 1787, Congress ordained an article of compact which guarantees that no 
citizen should ever be molested on account of his or her mode of worship or 
religious sentiments.373  Congress made that religious liberty guarantee forever 
unalterable except by the common consent of the parties.374  Ensuring that 
 
369. Case v. Toftus, 39 F. 730, 732 (D. Or. 1889) (citing Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845), 
Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845), and Strader, 51 U.S. at 82). 
370. Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 235, 241 (1850) (“[T]he Territory [was] admitted, in the language 
of the act, ‘into the Union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.’”); 
Permoli, 44 U.S. at 609 (citing the act of 1812 which admitted Louisiana “on an equal footing with the 
original states in all respects whatever”); City of Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. 234, 253 (1842) (quoting 
the statutory affirmation ‘“[t]hat the state of Alabama shall be one, and is hereby declared to be one of 
the United States of America, and admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, 
in all respects whatever”’); Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353, 374 (1840) (citing the 
statutory basis for the equal footing promise); City of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. 224, 235 
(1835) (citing “the act of congress for admitting the state of Louisiana into the union” for the “equal 
footing” language); Menard v. Aspasia, 30 U.S. 505, 513 (1831) (citing the “joint resolution of the 
Senate and House of Representatives [by which] the state of Illinois was admitted into the union, ‘on 
an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever’”). 
371. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 222 (“The manner in which the new states were to be admitted into the 
union, according to the ordinance of 1787, as expressed therein, is as follows: ‘And whenever any of 
the said states shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such state shall be admitted by its 
delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original states in all 
respects whatever.’” (quoting Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. V)); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 35 (1831) (“[N]ew states were to be formed within the ceded boundaries, to be 
admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original states[.] . . .  In this spirit congress passed 
the celebrated ordinance of July 1787 . . . .”). 
372. American Barge Line Co. v. Koontz, 68 S.E.2d 56, 61 (W.Va. 1951) (“The next question 
relates to the applicability of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  It has been repeatedly stated that after 
the admission of a state into the Union such ordinance is no longer of any force.” (citing Strader, 51 
U.S. at 95)). 
373. See Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. I. 
374. Id. § 14. 
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citizens are not disadvantaged or discriminated against on the basis of their 
beliefs on matters of religion is precisely the right formulation for government’s 
role.   
But should Chief Justice Taney’s Strader error really be corrected?  To do 
so will trigger the potentially messy task of enforcing the religious liberty 
guarantee that Congress enacted at the dawn of the nation.  As of 2019, it has 
been 232 years since the Confederation Congress enacted the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787; 168 years since Chief Justice Taney wrote his Strader 
opinion.  After all these years, why should we reconsider whether the articles 
of compact are still effective? 
One compelling reason is that the Confederation Congress ordained and 
declared that the provisions of Section 14 of the Northwest Ordinance “shall be 
considered as articles of compact, between the original States and the people 
and States in the said territory and forever remain unalterable, unless by 
common consent.”375  The analysis of the courts under which the articles of 
compact came to be declared “not in force” was intellectually offensive and 
should be corrected.  For example, in 1921, the Supreme Court engaged in 
especially objectionable misdirection when it observed: “[T]he Ordinance of 
1787—notwithstanding its contractual form—was no more than a regulation of 
territory belonging to the United States, and was superseded by the admission 
of the State of Illinois into the Union ‘on an equal footing with the original 
States in all respects whatever.’”376  Rather than engage in such sophistry, we 
should answer in the negative a question posed by Professor Andrew 
McLaughlin: “Will they say that, because the men of 1787 did not act and speak 
in the terms of the philosophy which arose from the civilization of the next 
century . . . they did not do what they intended to do?”377 
A second compelling reason to revisit Chief Justice Taney’s Strader error 
is the benefit society might realize from application of the Northwest Ordinance 
article of compact on religious liberty:378 “No person, demeaning himself in a 
 
375. Id. 
376. Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 120 (1921) (quoting Permoli v. 
City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589, 609 (1845)). 
377. McLaughlin, Social Compact, supra note 111, at 487. 
378. See Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. I.  Several of the Northwest Ordinance 
articles of compact would not have any application today, including the fourth (secession), fifth 
(admission of states out of the Northwest Territory), and sixth (slavery).  As to others, a combination 
of subsequent guarantees and the course of events suggest that the Northwest Ordinance provisions 
would be of only limited utility, although minor differences in phraseology and presentation might 
loom large in the hands of creative experts in the various fields.  The liberty and due process guarantees 
of the second presumably were replicated with incorporation of provisions of the Bill of Rights through 
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.  The third compact does not seem to have 
contemporary importance.  The first part deals with education in such an aspirational fashion—that 
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peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode 
of worship, or religious sentiments, in the said territory.”379  There are intriguing 
arguments that the substantive guarantees of the Northwest Ordinance articles 
of compact provide more protection that would otherwise be available.   
It is true that since the 1940s, the Establishment Clause380 and the Free 
Exercise Clause381 of the First Amendment have been incorporated as to the 
states by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.  But the protections 
of the first article of compact are arguably significantly broader than those of 
the First Amendment.382  The First Amendment provides religious liberty 
protections against the actions of the government and those acting under color 
of law.383  In contrast, the focus of the first article of compact is on the victim: 
“No person . . . shall ever be molested.”384  It could be argued that using this 
formulation would give protection against the actions of private parties, not 
merely the government and those acting under color of law. 
The First Amendment provides religious liberty protections for the “free 
exercise [of religion]” and from actions “respecting an establishment of 
religion.”385  In contrast, the focus of the first article of compact is to guarantee 
the victim that he or she will not be “molested on account of his mode of 
worship, or religious sentiments.”386  It could be argued that this formulation 
provides all of the protection for the exercise of religion—“exercise of religion” 
 
“schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged”—that even if still effective it would 
not seem to encompass any substantial content; the second part deals with relations with Native 
Americans.  Given Federal preemption of Native American affairs, this provision would seem to have 
little if any contemporary relevance.  Beyond the anti-secession language, the fourth requires the 
citizens of the states to pay their apportioned taxes equal to the citizens of other states; precludes the 
states from interfering with Federal land grants, taxing Federal lands, or charging non-residents higher 
taxes; and prohibits interference with free use of navigable rivers.  It would seem to have little 
contemporary relevance, except with respect to the navigable waters guarantee.   
379. Id. § 14, art. I. 
380. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) (incorporating guarantee against 
establishment of religion). 
381. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion] . . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (incorporating free exercise 
guarantee). 
382. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion] . . . .”), with Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. I (“No person, 
demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode 
of worship, or religious sentiments, in the said territory.”). 
383. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”). 
384. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. I. 
385. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
386. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 2, § 14, art. I. 
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under the First Amendment and “mode of worship” under the first article of 
compact—and in addition provides religious liberty protection based upon 
religious sentiments.  Thus, atheists, agnostics, and all manner of non-believers 
would unquestionably be brought within the sweep of our religious liberty 
protections. 
It is not completely clear how the first article of compact would play out in 
the protection of the religious liberty interests of citizens with disfavored beliefs 
on matters of religion.  Perhaps the most substantial unknown is how the courts 
would interpret the phrase “be molested” in the provision.387  If “molested” 
means simply physically abused—jailed, beaten up, killed—then the protection 
is of limited utility.  If “molested” is synonymous with “disadvantaged” and 
“discriminated against,” then the protection becomes real.  And if such a broad 
construction was coupled with protection from the acts of private parties, the 
protection becomes a substantial improvement over the First Amendment. 
Who might benefit from a liberal construction of the Northwest Ordinance 
first article of compact?  A Muslim woman denied the opportunity to swear a 
testimonial oath on a Koran instead of the Bible specified by state statute?388  
An Air Force technical sergeant refused re-enlistment because he crossed out 
the words “so help me God” on the government form?389  An atheist taxpayer 
forced to pay taxes to a local government that emblazons its police cars with 
stickers proclaiming “In God We Trust”?390  A non-Christian citizen who wants 
to testify at a public hearing of her town council which begins with an official 
prayer to the Christian God?391  These are situations in which the first article of 
compact of the Northwest Ordinance, broadly interpreted, ought to give these 
citizens relief against being disadvantaged and discriminated against. 
But recourse to the first article of compact might complicate other 
situations.  What of the Christian bake shop owner who refuses to bake a cake 
for a same-sex wedding?  Assuming she could make the somewhat tenuous 
argument that the decision to bake or not to bake is a function of her religious 
sentiments, would she not claim that she was being molested by being forced 
 
387. Id. (“No person . . . shall . . . be molested . . . .”). 
388. See Allan W. Vestal, Fixing Witness Oaths: Shall We Retire the Rewarder of Truth and 
Avenger of Falsehood?, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 453–56 (2016).   
389. See Allan W. Vestal, The Lingering Bigotry of State Constitution Religious Tests, 15 U. 
MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 55, 95–101 (2015) [hereinafter Vestal, Lingering 
Bigotry]. 
390. See Allan W. Vestal, Cents and Sensibilities, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 245, 289 n.229 (2017). 
391. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 630–32 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Vestal, 
Lingering Bigotry, supra note 389, at 55–56. 
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to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding?392  And what of the more 
plausible claim of the marital couple that they were being molested on the basis 
of their religious sentiments that approve of same-sex marriage?393 
Chief Justice Taney’s Strader error should be corrected; the first article of 
compact of the Northwest Ordinance should be resurrected.  How should the 
religious liberty article of compact be interpreted and enforced?  Should private 
conduct be within its scope?  How broadly should the concept of molestation 
be taken?  Who should prevail when opposing parties both claim that they are 
being disadvantaged because of their religious beliefs?  Interesting questions, 
but issues for another day. 
  
 
392. It is assumed that the baker would not claim that the act of baking a cake constituted a 
“mode of worship.”  But see Colossians 3:23 (New Living Translation) (“Work willingly at whatever 
you do, as though you were working for the Lord rather than for people.”). 
393. The Human Rights Campaign reports that the following Christian denominations allow 
same-sex marriage ceremonies, sometimes with restrictions, sometimes decided at the local level, and 
sometimes with opt-out provisions: Alliance of Baptists, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), 
Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Metropolitan Community Churches, 
Presbyterian Church (USA), Unitarian Universalist Association, United Church of Christ, and Unity. 
Faith Positions, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/faith-positions 
[https://perma.cc/ESA4-VF88] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).  The same source reports the following 
traditions in Judaism allow same-sex marriage ceremonies: Conservative Judaism, Reconstructionist 
Judaism, and Reform Judaism. Id. 
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APPENDIX A, THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1787) 
An Ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States 
northwest of the river Ohio. 
Sec. 1. Be it ordained by the United States in Congress assembled, That the 
said territory, for the purpose of temporary government, be one district, subject, 
however, to be divided into two districts, as future circumstances may, in the 
opinion of Congress, make it expedient. 
Sec. 2. Be it ordained by the authority aforesaid, That the estates both of 
resident and non-resident proprietors in the said territory, dying intestate, shall 
descent to, and be distributed among, their children, and the descendants of a 
deceased child in equal parts. The descendants of a deceased child or grandchild 
to take the share of their deceased parent in equal parts among them; and where 
there shall be no children or descendants, then in equal parts to the next of kin, 
in equal degree; and among collaterals, the children of a deceased brother or 
sister of the intestate shall have, in equal parts among them, their deceased 
parent’s share; and there shall, in no case, be a distinction between kindred of 
the whole and half blood; saving, in all cases to the widow of the intestate, her 
third part of the real estate for life, and one-third part of the personal estate; and 
this law relative to descents and dower, shall remain in full force until altered 
by the legislature of the district.  And until the governor and judges shall adopt 
laws as hereinafter mentioned, estates in the said territory may be devised or 
bequeathed by wills in writing, signed and sealed by him or her in whom the 
estate may be, (being of full age,) and attested by three witnesses; and real 
estates may be conveyed by lease and release, or bargain and sale, signed, 
sealed, and delivered by the person, being of full age, in whom the estate may 
be, and attested by two witnesses, provided such wills be duly proved, and such 
conveyances be acknowledged, or the execution thereof duly proved, and be 
recorded within one year after proper magistrates, courts, and registers, shall be 
appointed for that purpose; and personal property may be transferred by 
delivery, saving, however, to the French and Canadian inhabitants, and other 
settlers of the Kaskaskies, Saint Vincents, and the neighboring villages, who 
have heretofore professed themselves citizens of Virginia, their laws and 
customs now in force among them, relative to the descent and conveyance of 
property. 
Sec. 3. Be it ordained by the authority aforesaid, That there shall be 
appointed, from time to time, by Congress, a governor, whose commission shall 
continue in force for the term of three years, unless sooner revoked by 
Congress; he shall reside in the district, and have a freehold estate therein, in 
one thousand acres of land, while in the exercise of his office. 
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Sec. 4. There shall be appointed from time to time, by Congress, a secretary, 
whose commission shall continue in force for four years, unless sooner 
revoked; he shall reside in the district, and have a freehold estate therein, in five 
hundred acres of land, while in the exercise of his office.  It shall be his duty to 
keep and preserve the acts and laws passed by the legislature, and the public 
records of the district, and the proceedings of the governor in his executive 
department, and transmit authentic copies of such acts and proceedings every 
six months to the Secretary of Congress.  There shall also be appointed a court, 
to consist of three judges, any two of whom to form a court, who shall have a 
common-law jurisdiction, and reside in the district, and have each therein a 
freehold estate, in five hundred acres of land, while in the exercise of their 
offices; and their commissions shall continue in force during good behavior. 
Sec. 5. The governor and judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and 
publish in the district such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as may 
be necessary, and best suited to the circumstances of the district, and report 
them to Congress from time to time, which laws shall be in force in the district 
until the organization of the general assembly therein, unless disapproved of by 
Congress; but afterwards the legislature shall have authority to alter them as 
they shall think fit. 
Sec. 6. The governor, for the time being, shall be commander-in-chief of 
the militia, appoint and commission all officers in the same below the rank of 
general officers; all general officers shall be appointed and commissioned by 
Congress. 
Sec. 7. Previous to the organization of the general assembly the governor 
shall appoint such magistrates and other civil officers, in each county or 
township, as he shall find necessary for the preservation of the peace and good 
order in the same.  After the general assembly shall be organized the powers 
and duties of the magistrates and other civil officers shall be regulated and 
defined by the said assembly; but all magistrates and other civil officers, not 
herein otherwise directed, shall during the continuance of this temporary 
government, be appointed by the governor. 
Sec. 8. For the prevention of crimes and injuries, the laws to be adopted or 
made shall have force in all parts of the district, and for the execution of process, 
criminal and civil, the governor shall make proper divisions thereof; and he 
shall proceed, from time to time, as circumstances may require, to lay out the 
parts of the district in which the Indian titles shall have been extinguished, into 
counties and townships, subject, however, to such alterations as may thereafter 
be made by the legislature. 
Sec. 9. So soon as there shall be five thousand free male inhabitants, of full 
age, in the district, upon giving proof thereof to the governor, they shall receive 
authority, with time and place, to elect a representative from their counties or 
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townships, to represent them in the general assembly: Provided, That, for every 
five hundred free male inhabitants, there shall be one representative, and so on, 
progressively, with the number of free male inhabitants, shall the right of 
representation increase, until the number of representatives shall amount to 
twenty-five; after which the number and proportion of representatives shall be 
regulated by the legislature: Provided, That no person be eligible or qualified 
to act as a representative, unless he shall have been a citizen of one of the United 
States three years, and be a resident in the district, or unless he shall have 
resided in the district three years; and, in either case, shall likewise hold in his 
own right, in fee-simple, two hundred acres of land within the same: Provided 
also, That a freehold in fifty acres of land in the district, having been a citizen 
of one of the States, and being resident in the district, or the like freehold and 
two years’ residence in the district, shall be necessary to qualify a man as an 
elector of a representative. 
Sec. 10. The representatives thus elected, shall serve for the term of two 
years; and in case of the death of a representative, or removal from office, the 
governor shall issue a writ to the county or township, for which he was a 
member, to elect another in his stead, to serve for the residue of the term. 
Sec. 11. The general assembly or legislature, shall consist of the governor, 
legislative council, and a house of representatives.  The legislative council shall 
consist of five members, to continue in office five years, unless sooner removed 
by Congress; any three of whom to be a quorum: and the members of the 
council shall be nominated and appointed in the following manner, to wit: As 
soon as representatives shall be elected the Governor shall appoint a time and 
place for them to meet together, and when met they shall nominate ten persons, 
residents in the district, and each possessed of a freehold in five hundred acres 
of land, and return their names to Congress, five of whom Congress shall 
appoint and commission to serve as aforesaid; and, whenever a vacancy shall 
happen in the council, by death or removal from office, the house of 
representatives shall nominate two persons, qualified as aforesaid, for each 
vacancy, and return their names to Congress, one of whom Congress shall 
appoint and commission for the residue of the term; And every five years, four 
months at least before the expiration of the time of service of the members of 
council, the said house shall nominate ten persons, qualified as aforesaid, and 
return their names to Congress, five of whom Congress shall appoint and 
commission to serve as members of the council five years, unless sooner 
removed.  And the governor, legislative council, and house of representatives 
shall have authority to make laws in all cases for the good government of the 
district, not repugnant to the principles and articles in this ordinance established 
and declared.  And all bills, having passed by a majority in the house, and by a 
majority in the council, shall be referred to the governor for his assent; but no 
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bill, or legislative act whatever, shall be of any force without his assent.  The 
governor shall have power to convene, prorogue, and dissolve the general 
assembly when, in his opinion, it shall be expedient. 
Sec. 12. The governor, judges, legislative council, secretary, and such other 
officers as Congress shall appoint in the district, shall take an oath or 
affirmation of fidelity, and of office; the governor before the President of 
Congress, and all other officers before the governor.  As soon as a legislature 
shall be formed in the district, the council and house assembled, in one room, 
shall have authority, by joint ballot, to elect a delegate to Congress, who shall 
have a seat in Congress, with a right of debating, but not voting, during this 
temporary government. 
Sec. 13. And for extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious 
liberty, which form the basis whereon these republics, their laws and 
constitutions, are erected; to fix and establish those principles as the basis of all 
laws, constitutions, and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed 
in the said territory; to provide, also, for the establishment of States, and 
permanent government therein, and for their admission to a share in the Federal 
councils on an equal footing with the original States, at as early periods as may 
be consistent with the general interest: 
Sec. 14. It is hereby ordained and declared, by the authority aforesaid, that 
the following articles shall be considered as articles of compact, between the 
original States and the people and States in the said territory, and forever remain 
unalterable, unless by common consent, to wit: 
Article I. No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly 
manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship, or religious 
sentiments, in the said territory. 
Article II. The inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to 
the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, and of the trial by jury; of a 
proportionate representation of the people in the legislature, and of judicial 
proceedings according to the course of the common law.  All persons shall be 
bailable, unless for capital offenses, where the proof shall be evident, or the 
presumption great.  All fines shall be moderate; and no cruel or unusual 
punishments shall be inflicted.  No man shall be deprived of his liberty or 
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land, and should 
the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take 
any person’s property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation 
shall be paid for the same.  And, in the just preservation of rights and property, 
it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have force 
in the said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect 
private contracts, or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud, previously 
formed. 
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Article III. Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education 
shall forever be encouraged.  The utmost good faith shall always be observed 
towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them 
without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty they never shall 
be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; 
but laws founded in justice and humanity shall, from time to time, be made, for 
preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship 
with them. 
Article IV. The said territory, and the States which may be formed therein, 
shall forever remain a part of this confederacy of the United States of America, 
subject to the Articles of Confederation, and to such alterations therein as shall 
be constitutionally made; and to all the acts and ordinances of the United States 
in Congress assembled, conformable thereto.  The inhabitants and settlers in the 
said territory shall be subject to pay a part of the Federal debts, contracted, or 
to be contracted, and a proportional part of the expenses of government to be 
apportioned on them by Congress, according to the same common rule and 
measure by which apportionments thereof shall be made on the other States; 
and the taxes for paying their proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority 
and direction of the legislatures of the district, or districts, or new States, as in 
the original States, within the time agreed upon by the United States in 
Congress assembled.  The legislatures of those districts, or new States, shall 
never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in 
Congress assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary for 
securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.  No tax shall be 
imposed on lands the property of the United States; and in no case shall non-
resident proprietors be taxed higher than residents.  The navigable waters 
leading into the Mississippi and Saint Lawrence, and the carrying places 
between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the 
inhabitants of the said territory as to the citizens of the United States, and those 
of any other States that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, 
impost, or duty therefor. 
Article V. There shall be formed in the said territory not less than three nor 
more than five States; and the boundaries of the States, as soon as Virginia shall 
alter her act of cession and consent to the same, shall become fixed and 
established as follows, to wit: The western State, in the said territory, shall be 
bounded by the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Wabash Rivers; a direct line 
drawn from the Wabash and Post Vincents, due north, to the territorial line 
between the United States and Canada; and by the said territorial line to the 
Lake of the Woods and Mississippi.  The middle State shall be bounded by the 
said direct line, the Wabash from Post Vincents to the Ohio, by the Ohio, by a 
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direct line drawn due north from the mouth of the Great Miami to the said 
territorial line, and by the said territorial line.  The eastern State shall be 
bounded by the last-mentioned direct line, the Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the said 
territorial line: Provided, however, And it is further understood and declared, 
that the boundaries of these three States shall be subject so far to be altered, 
that, if Congress shall hereafter find it expedient, they shall have authority to 
form one or two States in that part of the said territory which lies north of an 
east and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extreme of Lake 
Michigan.  And, whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free 
inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the 
Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in 
all respects whatever; and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution 
and State government: Provided, The constitution and government, so to be 
formed, shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in 
these articles, and, so far as it can be consistent with the general interest of the 
confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and when 
there may be a less number of free inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand. 
Article VI. There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the 
said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted: Provided always, That any person escaping into 
the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the 
original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the 
person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid. 
Be it ordained by the authority aforesaid, That the resolutions of the 23d of 
April, 1784, relative to the subject of this ordinance, be, and the same are 
hereby, repealed, and declared null and void. 
Done by the United States, in Congress assembled, the 13th day of July, in 
the year of our Lord 1787, and of their sovereignty and independence the 
twelfth. 
 
